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ABSTRACT 
Enhancing Capacity and Managing Demand to Increase Short-Term Throughput on the  
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge 
Kevin Carstens 
 
While there are many proposals for fixing congestion between San Francisco and Oakland 
in California by adding a new bridge or tube, these solutions will take decades to implement even 
though a solution is needed now. This thesis assesses sixteen different strategies for reducing 
congestion in the short-term in the four categories of improving transit, promoting carpooling, 
implementing intelligent transportation systems practices, and incentivizing alternatives to using 
the Bay Bridge. Top priorities include HOV improvements on the West Grand Avenue and Powell 
Street onramps, altering WestCAT Lynx and BART transit services, partnering with rideshare apps 
to increase transit station accessibility (last mile problem), partnering with vanpool/minibus apps, 
promoting carpooling and implementing a citizen report system for carpool violators, shifting 
corporate cultures away from requiring employees to drive and drive alone, and lastly, altering 
land-use planning practices. To reach this conclusion, an inventory of current proposals and 
relevant research was compiled. Ridership and capacity data for the various modes of transportation 
across the bay were assessed for shortfalls and opportunities. Through this research and its resultant 
conclusions, focus can be placed on the best strategies to pursue in the near-term, while the Bay 
Area waits on a second bridge or tube in the long-term. 
 
Keywords: Demand, Capacity, Bay Area, Congestion, BART, HOV, San Francisco, Public Transit, 
Carpool 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
As anyone from the San Francisco Bay Area can attest, trying to get to San Francisco from 
the East Bay can be a nightmare during the morning peak period. Currently, there are four main 
ways to cross the Bay between Oakland and San Francisco: by car or by bus on the San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge, by train through BART’s Transbay Tube, or by ship on the San Francisco 
Bay Ferry. However, all of these modes are at capacity and straining to cope with the increasing 
travel demands of the region. The American Highway Users Alliance ranked the approaches of the 
Bay Bridge as the 12th and 16th most congested freeways in the US by miles of queue (American 
Highway Users Alliance, 2015). See Figure 1.1. Of note, only the congestion on the I-80 
approaches are depicted, as evening eastbound congestion can extend to the I-280 interchange in 
San Francisco, and morning westbound congestion can extend well onto I-580 and I-880 in 
Oakland. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Bay Bridge Congestion (American Highway Users Alliance, 2015) 
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To deal with this demand, there are proposals to expand or build new infrastructure. For 
example, public officials have begun discussions on building a second Transbay Tube to relieve 
crowding in the existing tube, and provide additional capacity (Cabanatuan, 2015). However, this 
tube is at least 30 years off due to major financial and political challenges. Additionally, while a 
second Bay Bridge has never progressed beyond discussions, some proponents are advocating for 
its construction (Middlebrook & Mladjov, 2014). In light of recent experiences with 
challenges/delays these long-term infrastructure projects in California and elsewhere (e.g. high-
speed rail) have faced, short-term solutions need to be explored to increase capacity across the bay 
while the long-term solutions (e.g. second Transbay Tube) are implemented. 
 
1.1 EXISTING CAPACITY 
This section outlines the four main ways to cross the bay: car, bus, train, or ferry. 
1.1.1 Car 
In order to cross the bay by car, one must either use the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge 
or take extensive detours through the Richmond-San Rafael and Golden Gate Bridges to the north 
(around 27 miles), or San Mateo-Hayward Bridge to the south (around 45 miles). The bridge 
consists of five lanes in each direction, with a toll facility on the westbound direction on the east 
side of the bay. The annual average daily traffic (AADT) is 253,000 vehicles per day, or 25,300 
per lane (Caltrans, 2015a). Of these, around 124,750 vehicles per day pay tolls (Bay Area Toll 
Authority, 2016). This makes sense, as tolls are only collected in one direction, and buses do not 
pay tolls. As will be discussed in Section 3.4.1, the peak hour demand per direction is around 8,000 
to 9,500 vehicles. 
The Bay Area Toll Authority (BATA), the agency that oversees the bridge’s operations, 
promotes carpooling and diversification of travel times through congestion pricing. During peak 
periods, $6 per two axle vehicle (such as a car) is charged, compared to only $4 during non-peak 
periods. Carpool vehicles (three or more occupants) are only charged $2.50 at all times. Buses are 
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not tolled, nor are pedestrians and bicyclists (Bay Area Toll Authority, 2016). However, at present 
pedestrian and cyclist access only extends from Oakland to Yerba Buena Island, and not all the 
way to San Francisco. 
1.1.2 Bus 
Each weekday, Alameda County (AC) Transit provides over 500 bus trips across the bay 
on 28 lines (Transbay Service, 2016). See Figure 1.2. AC Transit carries 13,500 riders per day, 
which puts the system over capacity during peak periods and results in many complaints about 
overcrowding (Hursh, 2015). WestCAT Lynx, operated by the Western Contra Costa Transit 
Authority, provides 53 daily weekday bus trips between Hercules and downtown San Francisco 
(WestCAT Lynx, 2015). Fourteen daily bus trips are provided from Vallejo directly to the Transbay 
Terminal by SolTrans Route 200, operated by SolTrans and administered by the Water Emergency 
Transportation Authority (WETA) (Water Emergency Transportation Authority, 2013). 
Greyhound and Amtrak also provide buses over the Bay Bridge for longer distance travel. 
For instance, Amtrak California provides 30 weekday buses per day between San Francisco and 
Emeryville, where each bus connects with a Capital Corridor train with service to either San Jose 
or Sacramento (Capital Corridor Joint Powers Authority, 2015). However, these are typically 
excluded from commuter considerations as their service is more oriented to long-distance travel. 
Private companies such as Google provide private buses, but it is hard to assess their actual 
significance in terms of addressing capacity constraints during peak hours without fixed routes or 
schedules. 
1.1.3 Train 
Transbay rail service is provided by Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) through the Transbay 
Tube that connects the San Francisco peninsula to Oakland and points beyond. Currently, BART 
carries 423,120 weekday passengers (Bay Area Rapid Transit [BART], 2015).  Of these, 21,000 
passengers per hour cross the Bay during rush hour, nearing the line capacity of 25,000 passengers 
per hour (BART, 2014a).  
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Figure 1.2: AC Transit Transbay Bus Service (Alameda County Transit, 2015) 
 
1.1.4 Ferry 
The San Francisco Bay Ferry provides service from Oakland, Alameda, and Vallejo, to 
South San Francisco and several locations in San Francisco (San Francisco Bay Ferry, 2016). These 
routes carry 11,200 weekday passengers across the Bay (Water Emergency Transportation 
Authority, 2013). However, due to inadequate docking facilities, service is currently at or near 
capacity. 
 
1.2 INCREASING CAPACITY 
As evidenced above and assessed more in-depth in Chapter 3, the Transbay corridor is at 
capacity or nearing capacity across all forms of transportation. BART and the San Francisco Bay 
Ferry are looking into their own solutions, both long-term (e.g. a second Transbay Tube) and short-
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term (e.g. more ferries and docks) (Cabanatuan, 2015; Metropolitan Transportation Commission 
[MTC], 2009; Water Emergency Transportation Authority, 2014). Regarding the San Francisco-
Oakland Bay Bridge, since vehicular capacity has been reached, increasing person throughput is 
going to necessitate increasing vehicular occupancy. MTC has been considering two options: 
increasing the effectiveness of buses and of carpooling. 
1.2.1 Buses 
In order to increase both bus ridership and bus throughput, several tactics are needed. These 
include tactics already underway, such as upgrading bus capacity at the new Transbay Terminal in 
San Francisco (Alameda County Transit, 2015). This will help reverse terminal capacity restrictions 
compared to the current temporary terminal by tripling the number of buses that can simultaneously 
be served. As well, AC Transit plans to purchase 10 double-decker buses to add capacity to the 
transbay corridor. In the long-term, AC Transit is planning to offer bus rapid transit (BRT) service 
on the Grand-MacArthur corridor to the Bay Bridge and downtown San Francisco (Alameda 
County Transportation Commission, 2011). This includes implementing transit signal priority, 
shoulder running, and HOV/bus only lanes in strategic locations. 
1.2.2 Carpool 
Another way to increase person throughput without relying on increasing vehicle 
throughput is to increase the number of persons per car. This is best done through incentivizing 
carpooling. MTC has already implemented some tactics, such as high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) 
priority lanes at the Bay Bridge toll facility, and reducing carpool tolls to $2.50 (compared to $6.00 
for non-HOVs) (Bay Area Toll Authority, 2016). MTC is considering other incentives, such as 
extending managed lanes (HOV or other express lanes) or more park-and-ride lots. 
 
1.3 INCREASING DEMAND 
 These increases in capacity will be necessitated as the Bay Area grows well into the future. 
The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) predicts that the population of the Bay Area 
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will grow by 30% from 2010 to 2040 (MTC, 2013, p. 32). Assuming this correlates to an equal rise 
in transportation use, the existing systems will be further strained trying to keep up. As well, MTC 
and ABAG desire to shift 10% of travelers away from private vehicles and into public transit or 
active modes of transportation, in addition to reducing overall vehicle-miles traveled (VMT) of the 
region by 10% by 2040 (MTC, 2013, p. 106). In order to realize these goals, additional non-private 
vehicle capacity and managing demand among existing capacity will be necessary. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to arrive at solutions to the problem of demand exceeding capacity on the Bay 
Bridge, research on the feasibility and efficacy of various incentives for increasing person 
throughput is needed. In order to best perform this research, a review of existing literature is 
conducted. Solutions, best practices, and prior pitfalls can be gleaned from completed papers and 
integrated into this research. To this end, a variety of papers have been surveyed and their results 
compiled below. 
In their “West Grand Avenue On-Ramp and Immediate Transbay Mobility Improvement 
Projects” presentation, MTC outlines four elements towards improving Transbay mobility: West 
Grand Avenue on-ramp shoulder running lane, adding new Transbay buses and encouraging 
existing AC Transbay buses on I-580 westbound to use West Grand Avenue, providing commuter 
parking, and improving on-demand shared mobility (MTC, 2011). 
Element 1, adding a shoulder running lane to the West Grand Avenue on-ramp onto the 
approach to the Bay Bridge, will allow buses to skip queues that arise from the presence of the 
metering lights at the toll plaza. See Figure 2.1. This will require several modifications, such as 
improving drainage grate durability. 
Element 2, adding new Transbay buses and encouraging existing AC Transbay buses on I-
580 westbound to use West Grand Avenue, will improve run times and service reliability. New 
routes will add to transit rider versatility, and using West Grand Avenue in conjunction with 
Element 1 will allow buses to skip toll plaza traffic. 
Element 3, providing commuter parking, calls for adding three new park-and-ride facilities 
along the I-80 and I-880 corridors around Oakland. These three lots will add 700 spaces of capacity 
for users to either join in carpooling or board a bus. The first three elements are estimated to cost 
$35.6m. 
Element 4, improving on-demand shared mobility, is not really covered by the presentation, 
but seems to suggest partnering with ride sharing mobile applications, such as Uber and Lyft.  
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Figure 2.1: Bus on Right Using Shoulder to Jump Queue (MTC, 2011) 
 
Further insight on proposed transbay improvements can be gleaned from BATA’s San 
Francisco Bay Crossings Study Update. This report updates the 2000 San Francisco Bay Crossings 
Study, taking the previous study’s conclusions and updating them with findings from the twelve 
years between reports (AECOM, 2012). This includes predictions for reduced travel demand and 
tolling revenue, and increased environmental and construction costs. Despite the reduced travel 
demand, demand is still predicted to exceed capacity on the existing bridges and the Transbay Tube 
by 2035.  
Three alternatives from 2000 were not recommended for further study due to the changing 
conditions listed above. These are: building a new multimodal bridge/tunnel from SR 238 in the 
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East Bay to I-380 on the Peninsula, widening the San Mateo Bridge, and improving the approaches 
to the Dumbarton Bridge. 
The report introduces three new BART crossing alternatives, four new transit improvement 
alternatives, and 19 highway improvement alternatives. Of these, it recommends all four new transit 
improvement alternatives: BART station capacity improvements, BART skip-stop “metro” service, 
a bus terminal in the East Bay, and expanding bus service. It also recommends four of the highway 
improvement alternatives: adding a bus ramp to MacArthur Boulevard, improving HOV access at 
Powell Street and I-80, and implementing open road tolling on the San Mateo and Dumbarton 
bridges. None of the new BART crossing alternatives were recommended for further study. 
Another study on public transit was performed by Jochum et al. in their 2015 capstone 
project entitled “Comprehensive Public Transportation.” This paper is a university capstone project 
that analyzes a Columbus, Ohio, initiative to reduce single-occupancy commutes to 70% of the 
mode share (Jochum, Clendenin, Good, Mescher, & Blevins, 2015). The team analyzed the best 
practices of five different modes of transportation (car, bus, bike, walk, and rail) in five different 
cities (Indianapolis, Austin, Minneapolis, Charlotte, and Paris), and conducted an interview with a 
director of the Charlotte Area Transportation System. They concluded that Columbus should unify 
transportation administrations, work with employers to develop incentive programs for using 
transit, and implement HOV lanes and light rail.  
Speaking of public transit, Paul Belmonte’s 2014 thesis “All Aboard: Investigating Public 
Transit Use across Income Levels and Implications for Transportation Policy in the United States” 
analyses the correlation between transit use and a variety of factors at different income levels 
(Belmonte, 2014). It beings with an overview of how little attention transit receives in terms of 
funding when compared to roadways, and the (perhaps related) share of commutes made by transit 
versus by private automobile. Belmonte found that income relates to transit usage non-linearly, in 
that the poorest and wealthiest commuters are more likely to use transit than middle-income 
commuters.  
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One theory is that middle-income earners tend to live in auto-dependent suburbs, whereas 
both the wealthy and poor typically live in central cities, which are better supported by transit. A 
solution Belmonte mentions to increasing transit usage is to switch gas tax over to a VMT tax, 
which would incentivize shorter commutes. In addition, he proposes government-supported 
ridesharing arrangements and telecommuting. Belmonte concludes with a proposed inequality-
density matrix that charts various incentives for transit usage against axes of income inequality and 
urban density. After determining local conditions and what specific solution is desired, various 
proposals can be analyzed based on where they fall on the matrix. 
Another way to reduce VMT is detailed in Mark Goh’s 2002 paper “Congestion 
Management and Electronic Road Pricing in Singapore.” This paper details Singapore’s experience 
in preparing the island nation for congestion management and capping the roadway vehicle 
population (Goh, 2002). Since Singapore is such a small and dense nation, the standard strategy of 
matching congestion with roadway widening is not an option. As well, many users only consider 
the personal cost of automotive usage (gas, maintenance, time, etc.) and not the greater societal 
costs (adding to congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, etc.). The Singaporean government has 
realized this, and since the 1970’s has aggressively implemented a variety of tactics to curtail 
automotive usage, ranging from making purchases more expensive, to levying fees to enter the 
central business district (CBD), to expanding public transit. These approaches have had varying 
levels of success. 
One more modern solution is to implement road pricing, which tracks congestion and 
assesses a respective electronic fee. This system is similar to systems implemented in Hong Kong 
and the Netherlands in the 1980’s. Unlike these systems, Singapore’s road pricing network works 
through overhead gantries that “tag” cash cards in each vehicle, rather than a tracking system due 
to privacy concerns. Lastly, Goh concludes that viable transit alternatives are necessary to avoid 
strangling CBD vitality. 
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Another idea involving toll tags is Kalon Kelley’s 2007 “Casual Carpooling – Enhanced” 
proposal. This paper assesses a technology that could incentivize carpooling by means other than 
access to an HOV lane (Kelley, 2007). Traditionally, carpool is incentivized through access to 
special, often faster HOV lanes, or reduced tolls. This does not promote increasing vehicle 
occupancy beyond the minimum to receive this benefit, nor in areas without HOV or toll incentives. 
Kelley proposes a system where each commuter carries a radio frequency identification device 
(RFID) that connects to the driver’s device and chimes in whenever passing a special gantry. This 
could help promote maximizing car occupancy and carpooling in places where HOV lanes or tolls 
are impractical (such as surface streets).  
This system could also increase personal safety by ensuring that all drivers and passengers 
are held accountable by association with their RFID card and by extension, file on record. This 
could create a review system similar to Uber or other ridesharing programs, where passengers can 
see a driver’s ratings and vice versa. Lastly, supply and demand can be managed by increasing 
occupancy requirements during the most congested times of day, or increasing rewards for drivers 
who go to underserved casual carpool nodes. 
Lastly, relating to incentivizing carpool is Wang and Chen’s 2012 study on “Attitudes, 
Mode Switching Behavior, and the Built Environment: A Longitudinal Study in the Puget Sound 
Region.” This paper proposes that commuters who switch from carpooling to driving alone do so 
mostly for structural factors, such as travel time or travel cost (Wang & Chen, 2012). On the other 
hand, commuters who switch from driving alone to carpooling do so mostly for psychosocial 
factors, i.e. personal attitudes and beliefs. This was done through an analysis of commuters in 1989 
by those who drive alone versus those who carpool, and a follow-up in 1996 assessing if they had 
switched and if so, why. Wang and Chen also found that many change their beliefs to fit whichever 
choice they pursue, e.g. after switching from carpooling to driving alone, that driver will begin to 
feel like carpooling is burdensome. 
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One telling piece of evidence is that structural incentive programs, such as fee reduction or 
exemption for carpools, and ride-matching services, affect carpool rates by only one percent. Wang 
and Chen conclude that instead, psychosocial factors should be promoted as they are why most 
carpoolers made the switch. One proposed solution is to raise the commuting population’s 
awareness about the costs, personal and societal, of driving alone. 
Summed together, this research gleans a variety of solutions for improving operations on 
the transbay corridor that will form the basis for this research. Some strategies, such as those from 
MTC, focus directly on the Bay Area, and will be fleshed out further and compared against other 
strategies in Chapter 4. Other strategies implemented elsewhere, or simply proposed, will be 
assessed for relevance to the Bay Area. Lastly, some strategies are original to this thesis and are 
either inspired by the literature reviewed above, or are wholly new ideas. 
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3. TIME-DEMAND-CAPACITY ON THE TRANSBAY CORRIDOR 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
One powerful tool for analyzing the transbay situation is to compile a time-demand 
diagram. This diagram, presented as Figure 3.1 for westbound and Figure 3.2 for eastbound, lays 
out the fluctuations in throughput across the bay, broken down by mode. It is important to note that 
the data represented is throughput, not demand, as the data provided covers how many people or 
vehicles actually crossed the bay, not the number who attempted or otherwise desired to but did 
not. As outlined in the introduction, there are four primary modes connecting San Francisco to the 
East Bay: private vehicles, buses, BART, and WETA (the ferry). For this diagram, bus service has 
been broken down by agency: AC Transit, WestCAT Lynx, and SolTrans 200. Details on each of 
these modes is provided below. 
3.1.1 Private Vehicles 
Information on the number of private vehicles was provided by Kevin Chen at MTC, in the 
form of PeMS and toll plaza data (Caltrans, 2016a; Caltrans, 2016b; Caltrans, 2015b). He also 
provided a report that details occupancy rates (persons per vehicle) through the toll plaza (Caltrans, 
2012). This report states that on the bridge, HOVs have an average occupancy of 3.5 persons per 
vehicle, and general purpose vehicles (typically non-HOVs) have an average occupancy of 1.2 
persons per vehicle. These values were used to convert westbound vehicle counts, which were split 
by HOV and non-HOV, into persons. The weighted average occupancy heading westbound was 
used to estimate the eastbound occupancy, assuming a conservation of travelers and vehicles. This 
weighted average occupancy is 1.54 persons per vehicle. Since the toll plaza only measures 
westbound traffic, eastbound traffic was measured using PeMS data. Vehicle count data is from 
September 1st, 2015 to October 31st, 2015, for both PeMS and the toll plaza. Vehicle occupancy 
data is from typical 2012 peak hour toll plaza traffic. 
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3.1.2 BART 
Data for BART ridership was provided by Brendan Monaghan (personal communication, 
October 4, 2016), and BART capacity was provided by Duncan Watry (personal communication, 
September 22, 2016), both with BART. The BART ridership data included station origin-
destination pairs, sorted by destination and recorded upon exit in 15 minute bins. This data covered 
August 1st, 2016 to September 30th, 2016. The provided capacity data was a train timetable, with 
the length of each train in terms of cars specified. Using data from BART’s website, seating 
capacity and crush capacity was found to be around 70 and 200 persons, respectively (BART, 
2016a).  
3.1.3 AC Transit 
Data for AC Transit was provided by Michael Eshleman at AC Transit (personal 
communication, October 11, 2016). This data included ridership counts for every transbay trip 
made by an AC Transit bus, and their respective load factors. A load factor is the percentage of 
capacity used when the bus was at its maximum passenger load, which was used to compute bus 
capacities. For instance, a load factor of 0.5 in a bus with 25 riders would correspond to a capacity 
of 50 riders. The data provided covers June 27th, 2016 to August 19th, 2016. 
3.1.4 WETA 
Data for the ferry service was provided by WETA’s Scott Houston (personal 
communication, July 17, 2016). The data included passenger counts and ferry name for every trip 
operated by WETA in June of 2016. The ferry names were then matched to a separate table of 
capacities by ferry.  
3.1.5 WestCAT Lynx 
Data for the Lynx was provided by WestCAT’s Julia Schnell (personal communication, 
July 20, 2016). This data logs each fare, its timestamp, and its coordinates for the month of October, 
2015. Bus capacity was provided as 57 seats per bus. 
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3.1.6 SolTrans 200 
Data for Route 200 was provided by WETA’s Scott Houston (personal communication, 
October 4, 2016). This is because even though SolTrans operates Route 200, WETA administers it 
as a supplement to its ferry service, which is why the route only connects the Vallejo Ferry Building 
to the San Francisco Transbay Terminal. The data provided covers ridership for the month of June, 
2016, and capacity is assumed to be 57 riders per bus, similar to WestCAT Lynx.  
3.1.7 Data Processing 
For all transit data, ridership per trip per day was provided. By averaging the ridership 
across the same trip on different days, average ridership per trip could be attained. For the private 
vehicle data, the number of vehicles through the toll plaza by hour and day were provided, which 
were then averaged to find the typical number of vehicles through the toll plaza by hour. This was 
then multiplied by the average occupancy rates mentioned before to convert vehicles into persons. 
All bus and ferry data was provided by trip, and so it was possible to ascertain the average 
ridership and capacity per trip. BART data was provided by 15 minute increments, and private 
vehicle data was provided hourly. For the sake of legibility, it was decided that 15 minute bins 
would be the best unit of time to work with. The bus and ferry runs were binned into 15 minute 
intervals, and the private vehicle data was simply quartered, so that the counts for four 15 minute 
intervals would equal the counts for one hour. 
For the transit data, the most pertinent point of the trip for this thesis is crossing the bay. 
To this end, bus data is binned based on when the bus arrives at the Temporary Transbay Terminal 
for westbound trips, and when it departs for eastbound trips. Likewise, WETA’s data is binned 
based on westbound arrivals and eastbound departures to/from the San Francisco Ferry Building. 
Lastly, the BART data is binned based on when the existing passenger would have passed through 
the Embarcadero Station. For example, it takes 33 minutes to ride BART from the Embarcadero 
Station to the Walnut Creek station in the East Bay, so the 1:45pm Walnut Creek exits from 
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peninsula station origins were placed in the 1:15pm bin. A location map of the San Francisco transit 
nodes relevant to this analysis is provided in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.1: Westbound Person Throughput across the Transbay Corridor by Mode 
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Figure 3.2: Eastbound Person Throughput across the Transbay Corridor by Mode 
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Figure 3.3: Location of Relevant Transit Nodes in Downtown San Francisco 
 
3.2 PEAK HOUR DATA 
By isolating the peak hour in each direction, a better mode breakdown can be created. In 
the westbound direction, the peak hour is 8:00am to 9:00am, when 44,351 commuters enter San 
Francisco from across the bay. In the eastbound direction, this hour is 5:15pm to 6:15pm, when 
41,582 commuters head the other way. The outright majority of these trips are made via BART, 
with a sizable minority made in private vehicles, as Figures 3.4 and 3.5 depict. AC Transit, WETA, 
and WestCAT Lynx make up the remainder of the trips, 10.9% eastbound and 8.9% westbound. 
SolTrans Route 200 does not run during either of these peak hours. 
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Figure 3.4: Westbound Peak Hour Transbay Trips by Mode 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Eastbound Peak Hour Transbay Trips by Mode 
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3.3 OVERALL DAILY DATA 
In addition to assessing transbay crossings through the day and during the peak hours, it is 
also pertinent to evaluate the day as a whole. In total, around 333,825 people cross the bay into San 
Francisco and 333,010 cross the bay leaving San Francisco every day. The majority of these trips 
are made via private vehicle, in sharp contrast to BART’s dominance during the peak hours. This 
is because while BART reigns supreme during peak hours in the peak directions, all other hours 
are dominated by private vehicle traffic. Transit modes other than BART carry barely any riders in 
the “reverse commute” direction (out of San Francisco in the morning and into San Francisco in 
the evening), while private vehicles see only a mild drop in throughput. Another interesting note is 
that BART carries around 234,000 commuters across the bay daily, out of around 440,600 total 
daily BART riders (BART, 2016b). This means that 53% of BART’s ridership, just over half, 
utilize the Transbay Tube, highlighting the infrastructure’s critical importance to BART’s 
operations. The breakdown of mode choice across the bay through the day is provided in Figure 
3.6 for the westbound direction, and Figure 3.7 for the eastbound direction. 
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Figure 3.6: Westbound Daily Transbay Trips by Mode 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Eastbound Daily Transbay Trips by Mode 
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3.4 DEMAND, CAPACITY, AND OCCUPANCY 
Demand (or more exactly, throughput) is only part of the equation. The problem with 
congestion is that inherently there is more demand than capacity. Therefore, it is important to 
consider limitations imposed by capacity as well. The easiest way to do this is to take a look at each 
mode individually. 
3.4.1 Private Vehicles 
With private vehicles, there are two forms of capacity: the number of vehicles able to cross 
the bridge, and the number of people able to sit in each vehicle.  
3.4.1.1 Bridge Capacity of Vehicles 
Since the Bay Bridge is at capacity during the peak hours, as evidenced by the massive 
queues that build up to cross the bridge, it is safe to assume that the greatest hourly vehicle count 
is a reasonable estimate of capacity. This corresponds to 9,222 vehicles that cross at 5:00am to 
6:00am in the westbound direction, and 8,512 vehicles that cross at 3:00pm to 4:00pm in the 
eastbound direction. These numbers make sense, as freeway capacity is estimated to be 1,700 to 
2,300 passenger cars per hour per lane (Caltrans, p. 133). At five lanes, this translates to 8,500 to 
11,500 passenger cars per hour on the bridge. While I-80 on the Bay Bridge is a freeway and as 
such should have capacity towards the higher end of the range, conditions are not ideal due to a 
reduced speed limit (50 MPH), narrow lanes, and narrow to non-existent shoulders. It is also 
important to note that this range is in terms of passenger cars, while the actual counts are in terms 
of vehicles, which include passenger cars as well as trucks, buses, and RVs. According to Caltrans, 
2.58% of Bay Bridge traffic in 2014 were trucks (Caltrans, 2014, p. 97). Out of around 263,000 
vehicles crossing the Bay Bridge daily, only 655 (0.25%) are scheduled commuter buses. Non-
commuter buses and RVs are assumed to be negligible. Using an equivalency value of 1.5 
passenger cars per truck/bus and a truck/bus percentage of 2.83% (2.58% + 0.25%), this adds 130 
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westbound and 120 eastbound vehicles (Caltrans, p. 133). This comes out to an equivalent of 9,352 
westbound and 8,632 eastbound passenger cars. 
Another interesting point to note is that the observed peak hour for private vehicle counts 
preceded the peak hour for all modes. In the westbound direction, the all-mode peak hour is 8:00am 
to 9:00am, whereas the private vehicle peak hour is 5:00am to 6:00am. In the eastbound direction, 
the all-mode peak hour is 5:15pm to 6:15pm, whereas the private vehicle peak hour is 3:00pm to 
4:00pm. This separation of peak hours is most likely due to congestion slowing down traffic during 
the all-mode peak hour. The private vehicle peak hour volume indicates the most amount of cars 
that are able to cross the bridge right before demand increases too high and conditions break down. 
Demand to cross may be higher at 8:00am and 5:15pm, but due to queuing delay less cars are able 
to get through. While actual demand is nearly impossible to measure, actual throughput is easy to 
obtain, as demonstrated before in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. This throughput is presented again below in 
Figure 3.8, this time in terms of passenger car equivalents rather than occupants or vehicles.  
The westbound direction seems to fluctuate more than eastbound, most likely due to 
complications from the toll plaza and its metering lights. While many drivers opt to use FasTrak 
for a toll-in-motion experience, many stick to paying cash, which requires stopping for a cash 
transaction. Additionally, HOVs (which must use FasTrak) are physically separated from other 
FasTrak users, and so the rate of HOV usage fluctuating can also cause the toll plaza throughput to 
fluctuate. It is also important to consider that the metering lights only permit a certain throughput, 
so HOVs (which are not stopped by the meter) count against FasTrak and cash vehicles, reducing 
their throughput. The HOV toll is only discounted from 5:00am to 10:00am and 3:00pm to 7:00pm, 
and HOVs pay the same toll as non-HOVs otherwise. Therefore, it makes sense that HOVs see a 
huge uptick during particularly the morning carpool hours, as shown in Figure 3.9.  
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Figure 3.8: Average Bay Bridge Crossings by Hour in Terms of Passenger Car Equivalents 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Westbound HOV and Non-HOV Counts by Hour 
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On the other hand, eastbound traffic seems to be much more stable during the afternoons, 
approximately 2:00pm to 8:00pm. This is most likely because without a toll plaza or metering 
lights, traffic is free to flow (and queue) without consideration for FasTrak versus cash or HOV 
versus non-HOV. Instead, demand hits capacity at around 8,632 passenger cars per hour as 
previously discussed, and any demand greater than that gets stuck in queues on I-80 and US-101 
west of the bridge, and in downtown San Francisco. 
3.4.1.2 Vehicle Capacity of Occupants 
 While the data for average passenger car size in terms of seats does not seem to be 
available, a value of five seats per car can be approximated as the median value. This value comes 
from an inventory of market share by vehicle that shows that SUVs, sedans, and other car types 
consist of around a third of sales each (IHS Markit, 2014). Typical capacity is seven or eight persons 
for SUVs, five persons for sedans, and two to five persons for the remainder, which includes 
coupes, pickups, hatchbacks, etc. Therefore, it is most prudent to use the median value of five seats 
per car. The major drawback to this methodology is that it relies on sales data rather than active 
private fleet data, which is not available. However, an inspection of actual traffic on the Bay Bridge 
confirms that five seats per vehicle is at minimum a reasonable estimate.  
3.4.1.3 Total Private Vehicle Capacity 
 Combining the vehicle seat capacity from Section 3.4.1.2 with the bridge capacity from 
Section 3.4.1.3 yields the total theoretical capacity of seats crossing the bridge throughout the day. 
This can be paired with occupancy data from Section 3.1.1 to find the percent of theoretical capacity 
used. Throughput versus theoretical capacity across the day is shown in Figure 3.10 for westbound 
and Figure 3.11 for eastbound, and percent of theoretical capacity used across the day is shown in 
Figure 3.12. 
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Figure 3.10: Westbound Actual Throughput and Theoretical Capacity of the Bay Bridge 
 
Figure 3.11: Eastbound Actual Throughput and Theoretical Capacity of the Bay Bridge 
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Figure 3.12: Percent of Theoretical Capacity Used on the Bay Bridge 
 
The westbound capacity was found to be 46,108 persons per hour, from multiplying the 
greatest hourly throughput, 9,222 vehicles as discussed in Section 3.4.1.1, by five seats per vehicle. 
The eastbound capacity of 42,559 persons per hour was found the same way, using 8,512 vehicles 
per hour. Interestingly, due to varying rates of carpool usage, the greatest use of capacity in the 
westbound direction was during the 7:00am hour, at 40%, not at 5:00am when the greatest number 
of vehicles crossed. This means that from 7:00am to 8:00am, 40% of the private vehicle seats that 
crossed the Bay Bridge were occupied. In the eastbound direction, the greatest use of capacity was 
during both the 2:00pm and 3:00pm hours, with 31% each. Across the day, the westbound direction 
had an average of 18.5% use of capacity, and the eastbound had an average 19.7% use of capacity. 
3.4.2 BART 
For BART, complete origin-destination ridership numbers are available due to the nature 
of BART’s fare system, where users must tag in and tag out in order to charge the relevant fare. 
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The more complex task is assessing capacity. While a timetable of train lengths was provided, train 
length needed to be converted to passenger capacity. As mentioned before, two capacity numbers 
are provided on BART’s website: around 70 seated and 200 in crush conditions. It is important to 
note that perceived comfort is not tied to these numbers, however, due to the natural tendency for 
passengers to gravitate toward the center of the train. For instance, it is not uncommon for the 
middle cars to be standing-room only while the end cars have available seats. Likewise, some seats 
are disregarded outright by riders due to sanitary concerns or preference to stand rather than sit next 
to a stranger. Lastly, some riders consume multiple seats with bags or by spreading out.  
Regarding crush capacity, while 200 is the outright maximum capacity of a car, this is often 
not fully realized due to passengers failing to compress into the middle or taking up extra space, 
again with bags or by spreading out. At no point did ridership surpass the crush capacity, and the 
closest it came was in the eastbound direction at 5:30pm to 5:45pm, when there were 6,492 riders 
and a crush capacity of 9,000 for a crush capacity percentage of 72.1%. Comparatively, the seat 
capacity during this period was 3,150 seats, for a seat capacity percentage of 206.1%. The full data 
for ridership versus seat capacity is provided in Figure 3.13 for westbound and Figure 3.14 for 
eastbound. Figure 3.15 charts the seat capacity percentage for both directions across the day. 
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Figure 3.13: Westbound BART Transbay Tube Ridership and Seat Surplus or Deficit 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Eastbound BART Transbay Tube Ridership and Seat Surplus or Deficit 
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Figure 3.15: BART Transbay Tube Seat Occupancy Rates 
 
3.4.3 AC Transit 
AC Transit provided data for ridership and load factors for each run made over a two month time 
period. As previously discussed, the load factor is the percentage of capacity used. This relationship 
was used to determine capacities of AC Transit’s transbay services. It is important to note that these 
are crush capacities rather than seating capacities. While seating capacity data is not available, it 
can be assumed to be less than the average calculated capacity of 85, which is a reasonable capacity 
for a transbay bus between seated and standing riders. Figures 3.16 and 3.17 provide ridership 
versus capacity for the westbound and eastbound directions, respectively. 
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Figure 3.16: Westbound AC Transit Transbay Ridership and Seat Surpluses 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Eastbound AC Transit Transbay Ridership and Seat Surpluses 
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leaving the Transbay Terminal during those 15 minutes, while actual occupancies of each bus may 
differ. For instance, the 5:10pm eastbound Route C has an average occupancy of 32%, versus the 
5:15pm eastbound Route J at 88%. Only one run of one route recorded operating above capacity: 
the 5:30pm eastbound Route FS at 105% occupancy. Figure 3.18 charts the average occupancy rate 
for both directions across the day. 
 
 
Figure 3.18: AC Transit Transbay Occupancy Rates 
 
3.4.4 WETA 
Data for WETA included passenger counts and vessel names for each run made during the 
study month. Vessel capacities by name were also provided, so it was a trivial matter to match 
capacity to ridership. WETA operates 12 revenue ferries that range in capacity from Gemini at 149, 
to Zelinsky at 399. Additionally, the tourist company Blue & Gold Fleet provided four of its ferries 
to aid with vessel shortages over the course of the month, three with a capacity of 396 and one (the 
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the month the ferry hit capacity a total of 48 times. Table 3.1 lists these full ferries. For some runs, 
the capacity is shown as a range because multiple ferries with different capacities were used. 
 
Table 3.1: Instances When WETA Ferry Service Hit Capacity 
Instances Departure Arrival Capacity Location Time Location Time 
1 Alameda/Oakland 7:45am Ferry Building 8:00am 250 
10 Ferry Building 5:20pm Alameda/Oakland 5:40pm 331 
12 Vallejo 7:00am Ferry Building 7:55am 320-330 
1 Vallejo 7:45am Ferry Building 8:45am 267 
1 Vallejo 10:30am Ferry Building 11:30am 267 
6 Ferry Building 3:30pm Vallejo 4:25pm 267 
7 Ferry Building 4:30pm Vallejo 5:30pm 267-330 
8 Ferry Building 5:15pm Vallejo 6:15pm 320-330 
2 Ferry Building 6:00pm Vallejo 6:55pm 267 
 
In addition to these 48 instances of hitting capacity, there were many more where the ferry 
was only a few riders short of capacity. Since ridership was determined via hand count, it is entirely 
possible that there were more at capacity than listed above. Additionally, a total of 1,764 runs were 
analyzed, meaning at-capacity runs represent around 2.7% of all runs. In terms of the monthly 
average, no block of time was at or over capacity, the nearest being the eastbound 5:15pm-5:30pm 
block at 96% occupancy. However, it is important to note that due to safety concerns, ferries are 
not allowed to operate above their official capacity. Therefore, if demand is higher than capacity, 
the extra riders can’t “crush” in like with a bus or BART. Instead, they are left behind and must 
either wait for the next ferry or find an alternative mode of transportation. Data for ridership versus 
capacity is provided in Figure 3.19 for westbound and Figure 3.20 for eastbound. Figure 3.21 charts 
the occupancy rate for both directions across the day. 
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Figure 3.19: Westbound WETA Transbay Ridership and Capacity Surpluses 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Eastbound WETA Transbay Ridership and Capacity Surpluses 
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Figure 3.21: WETA Transbay Occupancy Rates 
 
3.4.5 WestCAT Lynx 
Data for the Lynx service from Hercules to San Francisco included fare tags for every rider 
during the study month. These were split by trip and direction based on timestamp and coordinates. 
Capacity was easy to quantify since WestCAT utilizes a standard commuter bus with a seated 
capacity of 57 riders on all runs. While potentially additional riders could stand, in practice that 
might prove uncomfortable for the 30-45 minute bus ride. Just as well that this is a rare concern 
given that the highest ridership instance during the study month was 41 riders. Ridership versus 
surplus capacity data is provided in Figures 3.22 and 3.23 for westbound and eastbound, 
respectively. The 57 rider capacity becomes apparent by the height of each bar, and the two bars in 
each direction that are twice that height are simply time bins with two runs. Occupancy rate data is 
provided in Figure 3.24. 
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Figure 3.22: Westbound WestCAT Lynx Ridership and Capacity Surpluses 
 
 
Figure 3.23: Eastbound WestCAT Lynx Ridership and Capacity Surpluses 
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Figure 3.24: WestCAT Lynx Occupancy Rates 
 
3.4.6 SolTrans 200 
As previously mentioned, data for SolTrans Route 200 was provided by WETA as the ferry 
agency administers the route as a supplement for its Vallejo-San Francisco ferry service, even 
though SolTrans operates the bus route. Passenger counts for the month were provided and 
averaged, and capacity was given as 57 seated riders per bus, similar to WestCAT Lynx. Despite 
the infrequent service of the route, many of the runs were near capacity due to the route’s function 
as a relief service to the much more frequent ferry. Because of the difference in scale, it is easy to 
see how an overcrowded ferry with a capacity of 300+ riders would fill up a 57 seat commuter bus. 
During the study month, three runs hit capacity and another 16 had more than 50 riders, representing 
7% of the 264 sample runs. Ridership versus surplus capacity data is provided in Figures 3.25 and 
3.26 for westbound and eastbound, respectively. Occupancy rate data is provided in Figure 3.27. 
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Figure 3.25: Westbound SolTrans Route 200 Ridership and Capacity Surpluses 
 
 
Figure 3.26: Eastbound SolTrans Route 200 Ridership and Capacity Surpluses 
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Figure 3.27: SolTrans Route 200 Occupancy Rates 
 
3.4.7 All Modes 
 Now that the occupancy rate has been assessed by mode, the total throughput and capacity 
for the transbay corridor can be compiled. Of note, converting the private vehicle data from hourly 
to every 15 minutes was done by simply quartering the hourly data, similar to Section 3.1.7. In 
Figure 3.28 for westbound and Figure 3.29 for eastbound, the total number of persons crossing the 
bay is charted against the total number of seats crossing the bay. A line denoting the percentage of 
seats occupied accompanies these charts. 
 During the early morning hours of 1:00am to 4:00am, the total capacity is simply the 
theoretical 15 minute private vehicle capacity with five seats each. This amounts to 11,527 seats 
every 15 minutes westbound and 10,640 seats every 15 minutes eastbound. All greater capacity 
values are from transit services. Interestingly, during one 15 minute interval in each direction, the 
number of riders exceeded the theoretical 15 minute private vehicle capacity. This was 11,905 
riders at 8:45am in the westbound direction, and 11,047 riders at 5:15pm in the eastbound direction. 
The greatest westbound capacity was 17,261 seats at 8:00am, and the greatest eastbound capacity 
was 16,712 seats at 5:15pm.  The greatest westbound occupancy was 69% at both 8:30am and 
8:45am, and the greatest eastbound occupancy was also 69%, at 5:30pm. The total occupancy 
across the day was 25.6% in the westbound direction and 27.2% in the eastbound direction.
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Figure 3.28: Westbound Actual Throughput versus Excess Capacity and Occupancy Rate 
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Figure 3.29: Eastbound Actual Throughput versus Excess Capacity and Occupancy Rate 
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3.5 FUTURE CAPACITY TARGETS 
 The above discussion covers demand and capacity as it stands today, but what about in the 
future? As mentioned in Section 1.3, the Bay Area population is predicted to grow by 30% from 
2010 to 2040 (MTC, 2013, p. 32). If there is an equal increase in demand, then a matching increase 
in capacity will be necessary to simply maintain existing occupancy levels and prevent additional 
overcrowding. Table 3.2 lists the total present daily trips by mode, and total daily trips with a 30% 
increase in demand per mode. Additionally, it includes a tally of how many vehicles per mode 
would be needed to handle this added demand, assuming each vehicle is at capacity using the shown 
vehicle capacities. Lastly, it demonstrates how many additional vehicles would be needed if the 
fleet size per mode was also increased 30% to keep each vehicle at its current occupancy. 
 
Table 3.2: Vehicle Capacity Needed for Increased Demand 
Mode Private Vehicle BART 
AC 
Transit WETA 
WestCAT 
Lynx 
SolTrans 
Route 
200 
Total 
Present Daily Trips 406,369 233,981 17,549 8,122 583 232 666,836 
30% of Present Daily Trips 121,911 70,194 5,265 2,437 175 70 200,051 
Maximum Vehicle 
Occupancy 5 200 85 310 57 57 - 
Additional Vehicle-Trips 
Needed to Handle Future 
Demand, at Maximum 
Vehicle Capacity 
24,383 351 62 8 4 2 24,810 
Current Vehicle Occupancy 1.54 52 30 99 9 20 - 
Additional Vehicle-Trips 
Needed to Handle Future 
Demand, at Current Vehicle 
Capacity 
79,163 1,350 176 25 20 4 80,738 
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 However, MTC and ABAG also desire to increase the non-private vehicle mode share by 
10%, from the current region-wide average of 16% to 26% (MTC, 2013, p. 106). As can be deduced 
from Figures 3.6 and 3.7, the current non-private vehicle mode share on the transbay corridor 
exceeds this goal already, at 39%. This corridor does not get a pass though, as the goal is to increase 
the region as a whole, and the best way to do so would be to increase the non-private vehicle mode 
share on all corridors, transbay included. Table 3.3 copies Table 3.2, but redistributes the 200,051 
new trips in order to reduce the future private vehicle mode share by 10%, from 61% to 51%, with 
the trips being proportionally distributed to the remaining modes. 
 
Table 3.3: Vehicle Capacity Needed for Increased Demand, with Adjusted Mode Shares 
Mode Private Vehicle BART 
AC 
Transit WETA 
WestCAT 
Lynx 
SolTrans 
Route 
200 
Total 
Present Daily Trips 406,369 233,981 17,549 8,122 583 232 666,836 
Future Additional Daily 
Trips 35,743 147,600 11,070 5,124 368 146 200,051 
Future Mode Share 51.0% 44.0% 3.3% 1.5% 0.1% 0.0% 100% 
Maximum Vehicle 
Occupancy 5 200 85 310 57 57 - 
Additional Vehicle-Trips 
Needed to Handle Future 
Demand, at Maximum 
Vehicle Capacity 
7,149 738 131 17 7 3 8,045 
Current Vehicle 
Occupancy 1.54 52 30 99 9 20 - 
Additional Vehicle-Trips 
Needed to Handle Future 
Demand, at Current 
Vehicle Capacity 
23,210 2,839 370 52 41 8 26,520 
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 Comparing these two tables shows the power of the goal to increase non-private vehicle 
modes of transportation. Whereas 24,810 vehicle-trips are needed with each vehicle at capacity 
using the current modal split, only 8,045 are needed by moving 10% of private vehicle users to 
transit. It is important to note that this would not be done only by convincing all but 35,743 of the 
future daily trips to take public transportation, but by convincing some future users in conjunction 
with some of the existing 406,369 users to switch as well. 
 Taking an overall look at these targets for capacity increases to match future demand argues 
the need to evaluate ways to increase capacity or better manage demand to make use of 
underutilized capacity. For example, at present BART has 80,529 daily extra seats than riders. As 
Figures 3.13 and 3.14 in Section 3.4.2 demonstrate, most of these seats are available only in the 
off-peak directions and times. Even if the 30% growth, or 70,194 new riders, is evenly distributed, 
BART will begin to hit seat capacity on off-peak trips, and the crush loads will become even worse 
during peak trips. Especially if the goal of shifting private vehicle trips to public transit is achieved, 
and BART finds itself with 147,600 new daily transbay riders by 2040. 
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4. ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS 
 Now that it has been shown that the transbay services are straining to keep up with demand 
during peak commute hours, solutions can be explored. As mentioned in the introduction, a second 
bridge or tube will take many decades to come to fruition. Therefore, the focus here is on solutions 
that are more short-term. Sixteen strategies have been proposed in two broad categories: capacity 
enhancement and demand management. 
 
4.1 CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT 
 The first category, capacity enhancement, contains twelve strategies that focus on 
improving the capacity of the transbay corridor. These include tactics focusing on adding onramp 
HOV queue jumps, incentivizing carpooling, and increasing transit capacity. 
4.1.1 Strategy 1: Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards 
Currently, there is a wide shoulder on the West Grand Avenue onramp onto I-80 that is 
unused except by occasional buses or HOVs jumping the queue of cars waiting for the toll plaza. 
This tactic would legitimize this queue jump by improving the hardscape to bus lane standards, 
including restriping, signage, upgrading drainage inlets, and enforcement. This incentive was first 
proposed by MTC as Element 1 in their presentation, “West Grand Avenue On-Ramp and 
Immediate Transbay Mobility Improvement Projects,” outlined in the literature review and 
included in Appendix A. 
This proposal includes a base queue jump on West Grand Avenue from the I-580 eastbound 
off-ramp to the existing HOV ramp from the West Grand Avenue viaduct. Two possible extensions 
include extending the queue jump back from the I-580 eastbound off-ramp to the Maritime Street 
intersection, and extending the queue jump through that intersection down West Grand Avenue. 
See Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1: West Grand Avenue Queue Jump Overview 
 
4.1.1.1 Base Queue Jump Proposal 
The most instrumental part of this strategy is extending the existing HOV lane upstream 
from its current start, where the West Grand Avenue to I-80 westbound onramp splits into two 
structures, one for general purpose traffic and one for HOV. By extending it to the I-580 eastbound 
onramp, HOVs and especially buses coming from West Grand Avenue will be able to jump the toll 
plaza queue that backs up onto West Grand Avenue during peak hours.  
By taking 1ft. from the left shoulder, 8ft. from the right shoulder, 0.5ft. from the two left 
lanes and 1.5ft. from the right lane, four even lanes of 11.5ft. can be generated with a remainder of 
4ft. for the left shoulder and 2ft. for the right shoulder. This will allow the three general purpose 
lanes to remain, while making room for a new HOV lane. A cross section of the proposed change 
is provided in Figure 4.2. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.2: West Grand Avenue Before (a) and After (b) HOV Lane Extension 
 
4.1.1.2 I-580 Ramp Queue Jump Extension 
As helpful as the above HOV extension would be, it would be more effective to extend the 
queue jump past the I-580 eastbound onramp to the intersection with Maritime Street. This is 
because the extension will allow buses and HOVs to skip the worse of the congestion straight from 
the Maritime intersection to the toll plaza and beyond. From the Maritime Street intersection to the 
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I-580 eastbound onramp, the lane can be signed and striped for general purpose traffic heading to 
I-580 east and HOV traffic heading to I-80. Since traffic on this ramp is only 1500 vehicles daily 
(Caltrans, 2015c, p. 133), this should not greatly impact the HOV functionality of the proposed 
lane.  
By taking 3ft. from the left shoulder, 4.5ft. from the right shoulder, and 1.5ft. from each 
lane, three even lanes of 10.5ft each can be generated with a remainder of 2ft. for the left shoulder 
and 2.5ft. for the right shoulder. The narrow lanes are acceptable as this is right before a merge on 
a curve, so site geometry warrants slower speeds. A cross section of this segment is provided in 
Figure 4.3. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.3: West Grand Avenue Before (a) and After (b) HOV Lane Extension Past I-580 Onramp 
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4.1.1.3 Maritime Intersection Queue Jump Extension 
Lastly, HOV operations can be further improved by extending this queue jump past West 
Grand Avenue’s intersection with Maritime Street. This will allow buses and other HOVs to make 
use of a dedicated lane to help jump past the queue to pass through the intersection and rush hour 
gridlock all the way from the toll plaza. Traffic turning right onto Wake Avenue could also use this 
lane. Impact to HOV traffic is estimated to be minimal, as there are only a few tenants on Wake 
Avenue. By taking a foot from each lane and adding it to the current 8ft. shoulder, four 11ft. lanes 
can be generated. A cross section of this segment is provided in Figure 4.4. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.4: West Grand Avenue Before (a) and After (b) HOV Lane Extension Past Maritime 
Street Intersection 
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4.1.1.4 Overall Proposal 
With all elements combined, a bus or HOV can skip past the queue for the Maritime Street 
intersection and all the way to the toll plaza, without having to merge into general purpose traffic 
and potentially getting stuck there. This can result in major time savings for HOVs and buses; AC 
Transit transbay services could save eleven minutes during peak demand times by their estimate. 
AC Transit can make extensive use of this shortcut by rerouting Transbay service from south of the 
Bay Bridge through West Grand Avenue, in conjunction with transit signal priority on the West 
Grand Avenue corridor. MTC anticipates the cost of this project to be around $3,000,000 for around 
9,700 linear feet of restriping to accommodate the HOV lane, seventeen drain grate replacements, 
and signal and signage changes at the Maritime intersection (MTC, 2011, p. 11). 
As shown in Appendix A, a number of design exceptions will be required for this proposal: 
1. Nonstandard lane widths: 11.5ft. from the existing HOV ramp to the I-580 
eastbound ramp, 10.5ft. from the I-580 eastbound ramp to the Maritime Street 
intersection, and 11ft. from the Maritime Street intersection to the end of the queue 
jump. 
2. Nonstandard shoulders: 4ft. left and 2ft. right from the existing HOV ramp to the 
I-580 eastbound ramp, 2ft. left and 2.5 ft. right from the I-580 eastbound ramp to 
the Maritime Street intersection, and 2ft. left from the Maritime Street intersection 
to the end of the queue jump, with no right shoulder. 
3. Nonstandard gore on the ramp from West Grand Avenue to I-580 eastbound. 
4. Nonstandard merge on West Grand Avenue past the I-580 eastbound ramp  
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Figure 4.5: West Grand Avenue Onramp Upgrade Detail
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4.1.2 Strategy 2: HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville 
Several changes to the Powell Street and I-80 interchange in Emeryville, as well as to I-80 
through Emeryville, can improve the attractiveness of HOV and transit. These changes include 
adding a right-side HOV lane on I-80 from the southbound Powell off-ramp to the existing right-
side HOV lane before the toll plaza, converting the existing southbound Powell onramp to HOV 
and adding movements from the Powell Street intersection to allow more approaches to access the 
ramp, and building a new park-and-ride lot under the I-80 overpass. 
4.1.2.1 I-80 Right-Side HOV Lane 
Currently, there is a wide right shoulder along most of I-80 through Berkeley and the toll 
plaza. This could be upgraded to an HOV lane to help buses and carpoolers bypass queues from 
the toll plaza. The lane would start just past the southbound Powell Street off-ramp, where the 
rightmost lane ends in a merge. It will extend this merge through the interchange with a few feet of 
pavement widening to connect to the southbound West Frontage Road onramp. There, restriping 
would allow the HOV lane to continue through the merge. This merge of HOV and general purpose 
traffic could be managed with an “all access okay next ½ mile” policy similar to the left-side 
onramp from the Watt/I-80 light rail station in Sacramento.  
Continuing on, Alternative 1 would be to convert the rightmost lane to HOV until it can 
connect with the existing HOV lane right before the toll plaza. This would leave two general 
purpose lanes where there were three. This alternative is estimated to cost around $165,500, as 
outlined in Table 4.1. Alternative 2 would be more expensive, but have better operations, as it 
removes the barrier from the southbound Powell Street onramp and reroutes traffic in the proposed 
I-80 right-side HOV lane onto the onramp. Of note, the barrier is there to prevent onramp traffic 
from accessing I-580 eastbound across three lanes of traffic in a short merge, and so it would be 
important to maintain this limitation in any future alteration. Currently, the onramp merges with 
the existing general purpose lanes before curving to the west to cross the bay. Instead, this more 
expensive alternative would add a new isolated lane that bypasses the existing I-80 HOV structure 
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and connects with the existing HOV lane from the right. This alternative is estimated to cost around 
$868,500, as outlined in Table 4.2. These alternatives are shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Table 4.1: Cost Estimate for I-80 Right-Side HOV Lane Improvements, Alternative 1 
Cost Type Amount Unit Unit Cost Total Cost Source 
New Pavement 530 Square Yards $151.11 $80,088.30 (Plotner, 2015) 
New Paint 4900 Linear Feet $1.52 $7,448.00 (Caltrans, 2016e) 
Remove Paint 2500 Linear Feet $1.00 $2,500.00 (Caltrans, 2016d) 
   Total: $90,036.30  
53% Soft Costs (20% contingency, 15% overhead and 
profit, 10% general requirements, 5% permit and 
inspection, 3% bonds and insurance): 
$47,719.24 
 
   Total: $137,755.54  
20% Soft Costs (10% time-related overhead and 10% 
mobilization): $27,551.11 
   Total: $165,306.65 
   Rounded: $165,500.00  
 
 
Table 4.2: Cost Estimate for I-80 Right-Side HOV Lane Improvements, Alternative 2 
Cost Type Amount Unit Unit Cost Total Cost Source 
New Pavement 3000 Square Yards $151.11 $453,330.00 (Plotner, 2015) 
Remove Barrier 165 Linear Feet $33.90 $5,593.50 (Caltrans, 2016f) 
New Paint 7300 Linear Feet $1.52 $11,096.00 (Caltrans, 2016e) 
Remove Paint 2900 Linear Feet $1.00 $2,900.00 (Caltrans, 2016d) 
   Total: $472,919.50  
53% Soft Costs (20% contingency, 15% overhead and 
profit, 10% general requirements, 5% permit and 
inspection, 3% bonds and insurance): 
$250,647.34 
 
   Total: $723,566.84  
20% Soft Costs (10% time-related overhead and 10% 
mobilization): $144,713.37 
   Total: $868,280.21 
   Rounded: $868,500.00  
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Figure 4.6: I-80 HOV Lane Proposal, Split by Alternatives 1 and 2 
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Currently, AC Transit routes FS, G, H, L, LA, and LC, WestCAT Lynx, and SolTrans 
Route 200 all use I-80 southbound through the area this improvement would serve, representing 
1,824 daily riders and 713 AM peak hour riders who would receive a time-savings benefit. 
Additionally AC Transit routes C, F, J, and Z enter on Powell, representing an additional 1,879 
daily and 413 AM peak hour riders, for a total ridership of 3,703 per day and 1,126 during the AM 
peak hour.  
4.1.2.2 Improve HOV Access at Powell Street and I-80 
BATA’s “San Francisco Bay Crossings Study Update,” outlined in the literature review, 
recommends improving HOV access to the freeway from this important arterial. Currently, the only 
direction that can access the Powell Street diagonal onramp onto I-80 west is from the west. While 
there is demand for this movement, the majority of traffic seeking to get onto I-80 west is coming 
from the east, and must turn right from Powell onto West Frontage Road to get to the freeway. 
Operationally, this makes sense as it eliminates left-turn traffic from westbound Powell Street to 
the I-80 west onramp. However, only 2,400 daily vehicles make use of the restricted Powell Street 
onramp, versus 20,300 daily vehicles for the West Frontage Road onramp (Caltrans, 2015c, p. 28). 
This leaves much unused capacity that could be utilized by HOV movements from westbound 
Powell Street.  
The intersection used to have this configuration, but it was altered to improve operations. 
However, adding back in the movements for HOV only should greatly improve the attractiveness 
of HOV and transit by improving travel times and travel time reliability. As well, it will enable 
HOVs to access the HOV facilities at the toll plaza, as the current configuration essentially forces 
HOVs to sit in general purpose traffic, unless they are able to dart across five lanes of traffic in the 
short span between the West Frontage Road onramp and the I-80 left-side HOV ramp exit to the 
toll facility. Even without the other elements, adding these HOV movements alone will allow transit 
to jump around 0.8 miles of queue on I-80 using the lengthy Powell Street onramp.  
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BATA’s diagram of this proposed change is included in Appendix B. According to their 
cost estimates, this conversion will cost $1,248,000 and have a time-savings benefit of $6,468,000, 
for a cost-benefit ratio of 5.18 (AECOM, 2012).  
4.1.2.3 New Park-and-Ride at Powell Street under I-80 
The last element of this strategy is to construct a park-and-ride lot underneath I-80 on the 
south side of Powell Street. This lot could potentially contain 60 regular stalls, 3 handicap stalls, 3 
compact stalls, and 6 motorcycle stalls, for 72 spots total, as well as amenities for transit 
pickup/drop-off. Currently, AC Transit routes C, F, J, and Z pass by this proposed lot and so could 
easily serve the lot. Figure 4.7 shows a possible configuration for this lot in conjunction with the 
improved HOV access at Powell Street and westbound I-80 onramp. Figure 4.8 shows how buses 
could navigate the lot. This element is estimated to cost $494,000, from $6,857.14 per stall times 
72 stalls and rounded up to the nearest thousand dollars. The per-stall value comes from MTC’s 
estimate for new park-and-ride lots, as will be outlined in Section 4.1.5. It is important to note that 
this cost does not overlap BATA’s estimate for the intersection modifications at Powell and West 
Frontage Road/I-80 Westbound Onramp. 
Many more spaces could be developed on the west side of the I-80 westbound onramp, but 
these would less environmentally sound, as they would encroach on the nearby wetland reserves. 
Additionally, at present the site hosts several sculptures. These could be relocated to the other 
sculpture garden on the north side of Powell Street under the bridge, which is otherwise unaffected 
by this project. 
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Figure 4.7: Powell Street Park-and-Ride Lot and HOV Onramp Improvements 
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Figure 4.8: Proposed Bus Reroutes to Serve Park-and-Ride Lot 
 
4.1.3 Strategy 3: MacArthur Onramp Bus Lane 
This proposal, part of BATA’s report, would add a bus lane to the MacArthur onramp 
similar to the West Grand Avenue proposal above. Currently, there is no movement from 
MacArthur Boulevard that goes to San Francisco. The existing onramp only goes to I-80 eastbound 
(to Berkeley and beyond). The MacArthur to I-80 westbound movement used to exist, but was 
removed for operational reasons. When the movement was still there, the ramp from I-580 
westbound to I-80 eastbound (that the movement tied to) was only one lane. However, the I-580 
westbound to I-80 eastbound ramp has since been expanded to two lanes, requiring the MacArthur 
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onramp to be barricaded until past the merge to avoid entering vehicles from jumping across two 
lanes to access I-80 westbound to San Francisco.  
BATA’s proposal only calls for reversing one of the two lanes of the I-580 eastbound to 
MacArthur eastbound off-ramp and adding structural work to accommodate carrying the new 
onramp from the eastbound viaduct to connect with the westbound viaduct. As much time savings 
as this proposal offers, it could be further improved by converting the leftmost lane on I-580 
westbound into HOV from the new ramp to the existing end of the HOV lane before the toll plaza. 
This will allow buses and carpools to travel from MacArthur through I-580 and straight to the toll 
plaza without having to mix with general traffic and incur related delays. To best reduce operational 
complications from taking away a general purpose lane, the rightmost lane through this corridor 
should be converted from FasTrak only to general purpose. The lanes can resume their existing 
configuration where the viaduct touches down and the HOV lane moves aside.  
BATA’s original work is presented in Appendix C. Figure 4.9 maps the proposed changes, 
and Figure 4.10 calls out details at either end of the proposal. The new onramp alone is estimated 
to cost $11,100,000 and provide $13,340,000 in time savings benefits, for a cost-benefit ratio of 
1.20 (AECOM, 2012). The HOV lane extension is anticipated to cost an additional $17,500 while 
providing several minutes’ worth of saved time across the 0.7 mile extension. The HOV lane 
extension costs are outlined in Table 4.3 below.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: MacArthur and I-580 HOV Lane Overview 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.10: East End Details (a), and West End Details (b) 
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Table 4.3: Cost Estimate for MacArthur HOV Lane Extension 
Cost Type Amount Unit Unit Cost Total Cost Source 
New Paint 5200 Linear Feet $1.52 $7,904.00 (Caltrans, 2016e) 
Remove Paint 1500 Linear Feet $1.00 $1,500.00 (Caltrans, 2016d) 
   Total: $9,404  
53% Soft Costs (20% contingency, 15% overhead 
and profit, 10% general requirements, 5% permit 
and inspection, 3% bonds and insurance): 
$4,984.12 
 
   Total: $14,388.12  
20% Soft Costs (10% time-related overhead and 
10% mobilization): $2,877.62 
   Total: $17,265.74 
   Rounded: $17,500.00  
 
 
4.1.4 Strategy 4: Expand Bus Service 
This strategy is to add additional Transbay buses to both expand service and increase 
capacity. This tactic is also recommended by BATA’s “San Francisco Bay Crossings Study 
Update,” outlined in the literature review. To expand on these recommendations, perhaps WestCAT 
Lynx could expand service to Contra Costa County cities that are unserved by BART other than 
Hercules, such as San Pablo, Pinole, and Martinez. As well, perhaps SolTrans could expand their 
Vallejo-San Francisco (Route 200) service to Fairfield and possibly Vacaville. This incentive was 
first proposed by MTC as Element 2 in their presentation, “West Grand Avenue On-Ramp and 
Immediate Transbay Mobility Improvement Projects,” outlined in the literature review and 
included in Appendix D. 
4.1.4.1 AC Transit 
AC Transit currently carries 17,549 riders per day across the Bay Bridge, including 2,492 
into San Francisco during the AM peak hour and 2,849 out of San Francisco during the PM peak 
hour. This alone replaces a lane of private vehicle usage on the Bay Bridge using average rush hour 
private vehicle throughput and occupancy, which comes out to around 2,880 persons per hour per 
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lane. While this is great, additional capacity could take things further. MTC proposes replacing 20 
buses and adding 8 buses on two pilot services, at a cost of $27,800,000 (MTC, 2011). The 
replacement buses will increase attractiveness and ridership, and the new services will attract new 
markets of riders 
4.1.4.2 WestCAT Lynx 
Currently, Contra Costa County’s only transbay service, the WestCAT Lynx, connects a 
variety of stops in Hercules directly to San Francisco. It carries around 580 passengers per weekday, 
including 190 during the morning rush and 250 during the evening rush. One stop is the Hercules 
Transit Center, where the Lynx connects with local WestCAT services, creating an easy transfer 
for San Francisco-bound riders. However, several local routes do not connect to the Hercules 
Transit Center, but rather the Richmond Parkway Transit Center. The Lynx misses out on these 
potential transfers to instead provide local service to Hercules. 
Rather than spending time circulating around Hercules, the Lynx service should instead 
focus on intercity connectivity, leaving the local circulation to local routes. This will allow the 
Lynx to improve travel time reliability by avoiding surface traffic in Hercules and instead stick to 
freeways. Additionally, it will allow the Lynx to connect to more transit centers and bring on 
additional riders.  
One such transit center is the Martinez Amtrak Station, which is currently connected to the 
Lynx via WestCAT Route 30Z between the station and the Hercules Transit Center. By having the 
Lynx take over this service, it will free Route 30Z rolling stock and overhead to provide the local 
Hercules service that the Lynx would be dropping. Adding on the Richmond Parkway Transit 
Center would connect the Lynx to the remaining WestCAT routes that do not serve the Hercules 
Transit Center.  
In summary, the Lynx should convert to a route serving only the Martinez Amtrak Station, 
Hercules Transit Center, Richmond Parkway Center, and San Francisco Transbay Terminal, and 
Route 30Z should be repurposed to serve the lost local Hercules service. This will boost service to 
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areas of Contra Costa County not served by BART and pull additional riders out of their cars and 
onto the Lynx. A diagram of these proposed changes is provided in Figure 4.11. 
As part of these changes, local service provided by the 30Z in Martinez would be 
eliminated, including a spur to Muir Road and the VA Medical Center in Martinez. This is 
acceptable, however, as the local Martinez service would still be provided by Central Contra Costa 
Transit Authority’s (CCCTA’s) Routes 16 and 98X. Additionally, lost Muir Road and VA Medical 
Center service would still be provided by CCCTA’s Route 28, and to an extent, Route 3. 
At present, the Lynx directly connects to WestCAT Routes 10, 11, 12, 15, 19, 30Z, C3, JR, 
JL, JX, and JPX. Through this realignment, the Lynx will also directly connect to WestCAT Routes 
16, 17, 18, 19, as well as gaining a second connection to JR and JPX. Additionally, this realignment 
will directly connect the WestCAT Lynx at the Martinez Amtrak Station to CCCTA’s Routes 3, 
16, 18, 19, 28, and 98X, as well as Tri Delta Transit’s Route 200. At the Richmond Parkway Transit 
Center, the WestCAT Lynx will gain connections to AC Transit’s Routes 70, 71, 376, LA, and LC. 
In total, this will bring the number of East Bay routes connecting to the WestCAT Lynx from 11 
to 27. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.11: Current (a) and Proposed (b) WestCAT Lynx and Route 30Z Operations 
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4.1.4.3 SolTrans Route 200 
Currently, the only direct bus service from Solano County to San Francisco is SolTrans 
Route 200. While operated by SolTrans, this service is actually administered by WETA as a 
supplement to the ferry. One possible improvement to this service would be to extend it from the 
Vallejo Ferry Building to transit centers in Fairfield and Vacaville.  
However, a study of Solano County bus riders found that just over 11% of current riders 
ultimately reach San Francisco (Solano Transportation Authority, 2014). These riders 
overwhelmingly take Fairfield and Suisun Transit’s (FAST’s) Routes 40 and 90, and SolTrans’s 
Routes 78 and 80, which provide service between Solano County cities and the El Cerrito del Norte 
and Walnut Creek BART stations. Still, most of the riders of these services are only traveling within 
Solano County between Vallejo and Fairfield. 
A study commissioned by STA recommends reconfiguring intercity service to a “BART-
like service design” (Arup, 2014, p. 2). This will provide many of the same service improvements 
as expanding Route 200. Additionally, there are plans to eliminate Route 200 service in favor of 
increased ferry service, as the buses dedicated to Route 200 are aging and will need to be retired 
soon (P. Kamhi, personal communication, September 29, 2016). Only 6.5% of Vallejo-San 
Francisco passengers use the bus versus the ferry (Transportation Analytics, 2016, p. 4.3). Lastly, 
the US Census’s American Community Survey estimates that around 9,854 daily commuters travel 
from Solano County to San Francisco (Employment Devlopment Department, 2013). Of these, 
around 1,700 take WETA’s Vallejo and Route 200 services, and 490 ride other SolTrans routes to 
the East Bay before transferring to another service (mostly BART) that connects to San Francisco 
(Solano Transportation Authority, 2014, p. 11). This means that around 22% of Solano County 
commuters to San Francisco already use public transit, which is relatively fairly high considering 
the lack of frequent metro-like service provided by BART or other such operators. 
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4.1.4.4 Transbay Terminal 
While not a part of this thesis, it is important to note that the new Transbay Terminal, slated 
for revenue operations in late 2017, will drastically improve operations over the current Temporary 
Transbay Terminal. At present, transbay buses need to negotiate several congested blocks of 
downtown San Francisco between the freeway and the terminal. While SFMTA has done great 
work with dedicated bus lanes and movements to and from the terminal, buses still get caught up 
by the intersections, their queues, and confused (or just ignorant) private vehicle drivers. With the 
new grade-separated ramps between the Bay Bridge and Transbay Terminal, transbay services will 
be able to shave precious minutes off of travel times, increasing attractiveness and ridership. 
4.1.5 Strategy 5: Commuter Parking 
One reason potential carpoolers drive alone is a lack of suitable meeting places. Perhaps 
coworkers live too far out of the way to be worth sharing rides, or perhaps it is hard to find a parking 
lot that does not mind carpoolers that leave behind their cars during the workday. By constructing 
additional park-and-ride lots, more commuters can join together on their way to work, reducing 
traffic on the roads and boosting the efficacy of other carpooling tactics. 
Currently, there are four such lots in northwestern Alameda County (Caltrans, 2015d), 
defined as west of the San Leandro and Berkeley Hills and north of the City of Hayward. These 
spots provide a total of 503 stalls. Element 3 of MTC’s aforementioned presentation recommends 
three new park-and-ride facilities along the I-80 and I-880 corridors around Oakland for both 
carpooling and transit. These proposed spots will provide a total of 700 stalls, as outlined in 
Appendix E. Facilities along SR-24 and I-580 could provide additional benefit, to the tune of 569 
stalls. This would increase the park-and-ride capacity of northwestern Alameda County from 503 
stalls to 1,772 stalls. Table 4.4 outlines these lots, and Figure 4.12 provides a location map. For 
each lot, Table 4.4 denotes the nearby HOV facilities, for which there are few. However, all 
carpoolers from these lots heading into San Francisco are able to use the toll plaza HOV facilities. 
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Table 4.4: Park-and-Ride Lots in Northwest Alameda County 
Freeway Surface Street(s) City Status Stalls 2015 Occupancy 
Nearby HOV 
Facilities 
I-580 Center St Castro Valley Existing 138 80.4% None 
I-580 Foothill Blvd and John Dr 
Castro 
Valley Existing 8 100.0% None 
I-580 Fruitvale Ave Oakland Existing 178 66.9% None 
I-880 7
th St and Linden 
St Oakland Existing 179 102.2% 
I-880 eastbound 
onramp queue 
jump 
I-80 Buchanan St Albany Proposed (MTC) 268 - I-80 HOV lanes 
I-880 Fruitvale Ave Oakland Proposed (MTC) 272 - None 
I-880 High St Oakland Proposed (MTC) 160 - None 
SR-24 Telegraph Ave and 56th St Oakland 
Proposed 
(Carstens) 85 - None 
I-580 Broadway and Piedmont Ave Oakland 
Proposed 
(Carstens) 200 - None 
I-580 Golf Links Rd and 98th Ave Oakland 
Proposed 
(Carstens) 174 - None 
I-580 Fairmont Dr and Foothill Blvd 
Castro 
Valley 
Proposed 
(Carstens) 110 - None 
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Figure 4.12: Park and Ride Lots in Northwestern Alameda County 
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4.1.5.1 SR-24 and Telegraph Avenue/56th Street 
This proposed lot covers the two vacant lots on either side of 56th Street, below SR-24 and 
BART, and immediately west of Telegraph Avenue in the Bushrod and Shafter neighborhoods of 
northern Oakland. The southern vacant lot is bounded by 55th Street, Telegraph Avenue, 56th Street, 
and the embankment for SR-24 and BART. This space currently contains a driveway, a small, 
unmarked lot, and a utility shed. By expanding the pavement, the space can be made to 
accommodate approximately 35 stalls. The northern vacant lot is bounded by Carberry Avenue, 
56th Street, Telegraph Avenue, and lots built-out with business and residential. Currently, this space 
is completely vacant, with no pavement or other obvious land use. It could be altered to 
accommodate approximately 50 stalls, in addition to copious street parking on the streets around 
the lot. Figure 4.13 outlines the proposed lot and its vicinity. 
The advantage of this lot is that it would add capacity in an area that is poorly served by 
other park-and-ride lots. It would put to work vacant land that could not be converted to better uses 
due to the constraints of the SR-24 and BART overpasses. 
However, while it has great connectivity to SR-24 to the east, it lacks easy connections to 
the west (towards San Francisco). This could decrease appeal of the site to casual carpoolers, who 
would need to go further out of their way to access the lot than a simple touch-and-go from the 
freeway.   
In terms of transit, AC Transit local routes 6 and 12 pass by the proposed lot location on 
Telegraph Avenue. Route 6 has fairly direct service to the 12th Street and 19th Street BART stations, 
while Route 12 makes a more roundabout trip. More pertinently, transbay Route E passes close to 
the site and provides direct service to downtown San Francisco. It could deviate from its current 
path by a few blocks to accommodate the new lot. However, this would add a few minutes to the 
travel time, potentially offsetting ridership increases from serving the lot. 
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Figure 4.13: Proposed SR-24 and Telegraph Avenue/56th Street Park-and-Ride Lot 
 
4.1.5.2 I-580 and Broadway/Piedmont Avenue 
This proposed lot would upgrade the existing lots underneath I-580 and between Broadway 
and Piedmont Avenue, and Piedmont Avenue and Richmond Boulevard, to park-and-ride 
standards. Currently, the parking lots under this section of I-580 are underutilized and could be 
better repurposed. Additionally, there is room to expand parking further underneath I-580 between 
the northbound and southbound directions of Richmond Boulevard, which are split by an 
approximately 100 ft. median. While the median technically is the Oak Glen Park, the features of 
the park are suspended underneath I-580. While a diagram of this lot was impossible to 
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conceptualize due to the I-580 viaduct covering the study location, an assessment of the current lot 
promotes around 200 spaces for this proposed park-and-ride location. 
The advantage of this lot is its central location along with large size. It has the potential to 
capture single occupancy vehicles at one of the last possible moments before they join the queue 
to cross the toll plaza and onto the bridge. However, except for an eastbound off-ramp, there is not 
easy access to the freeway from this lot, which greatly decreases appeal. 
Regarding transit, AC Transit local route 51A provides frequent service to the 12th Street 
and 19th Street BART stations and passes by the location via Broadway. Additionally, transbay 
routes B, NX, NX1, NX2. NX3, NX4, NXC, P, and V pass overhead on I-580. While one of these 
could divert and provide direct service to the lot, because of the poor freeway connections it could 
add seven or more minutes to the average travel time. 
4.1.5.3 I-580 and Golf Links Road/98th Avenue 
This proposed lot would convert a currently empty field into approximately 174 park-and-
ride stalls. The lot is in the Grass Valley neighborhood of Oakland and is bounded by I-580, Golf 
Links Road, 98th Avenue, and the eastbound I-580 onramp. The proposed lot is diagramed in Figure 
4.14. 
The main advantage of the location is that it has no current use and is simply vacant. It is 
a large, flat, and clear space in an area that is otherwise built-out, hilly, or wooded. However, the 
main criticism of this location is that the land could potentially be better utilized than as a surface 
lot. Due to its proximity to the freeway, it would do well as a shopping center or high density 
residential. 
Regarding transit, AC Transit transbay route NX4 passes the location on I-580. With a 
slight detour, it could serve the location with minimal delay. 
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Figure 4.14: Proposed I-580 and Golf Links Road/98th Avenue Park-and-Ride Lot 
 
4.1.5.4 I-580 and Fairmont Drive/Foothill Boulevard 
This proposed lot would convert an unutilized freeway interchange quadrant into a park-
and-ride facility with 110 stalls. The lot is surrounded by I-580, the I-580 westbound off-ramp, 
Foothill Boulevard, and Fairmont Drive. In order to satisfactorily design a driveway to this lot, 
modification of the existing hardscape will be necessary. The off-ramp will need to be “tee’d” with 
Foothill Boulevard, and the raised median of Foothill Boulevard will need to be modified to 
accommodate the new intersection. Additionally, Foothill Boulevard recently has undergone a 
“complete street” makeover to better accommodate cyclists with buffered bike lanes and high 
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visibility markings. These improvements, mostly done via paint, will need to be maintained. Figure 
4.15 diagrams this proposed lot. 
 
 
Figure 4.15: Proposed I-580 and Fairmont Drive/Foothill Boulevard Park-and-Ride Lot 
 
Similar to the proposed Golf Links Road/98th Avenue lot, the primary advantage of this 
location is that it is an otherwise unused vacant piece of flat and clear land in an otherwise built-up 
neighborhood. However, due to its small size and location within a freeway interchange, the 
location is not as suitable for other uses and so perhaps is best converted into a park-and-ride 
facility. Not much other than perhaps a fast food restaurant or gas station could fit in this location. 
AC Transit local route 75 already connects the Bay Fair and San Leandro BART stations 
to Foothill Boulevard next to the proposed lot. AC Transit local route 89 also already connects the 
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Bay Fair and San Leandro BART stations to Fairmont Avenue next to the proposed lot. More 
directly, the AC Transit transbay routes NX4 and NXC already stop at Fairmont Avenue and 
Foothill Boulevard on their way to and from San Francisco. Therefore, no schedule changes will 
be necessary to accommodate this lot. 
4.1.5.5 Benefits and Costs of Proposed Park-and-Ride Lots 
The overarching benefit of adding park-and-ride capacity is pulling cars off of the bridge, 
reducing queues and delays. With a total of 1,772 Caltrans-maintained stalls between existing and 
proposed lots, as well as additional AC Transit and BART lots, significant demand is shifted from 
private vehicles on the Bay Bridge to alternative modes. 
MTC estimated that their three proposed lots will cost a total of $4,800,000 for 700 stalls, 
or $6,857.14 per stall, as shown in Appendix E. At that rate, the additional 569 stalls in this thesis 
would total around $3,900,000, for $8,700,000 total. 
4.1.5.6 BART Parking Capacity Increases 
It is important to note that the lots listed in Table 4.6 and mapped in Figure 4.12 are not 
the only parking lots in northwestern Alameda County, but rather only those park-and-ride lots 
maintained by Caltrans or proposals that would be maintained by Caltrans. Most notably, BART 
also operates parking lots at 27 of the 31 East Bay stations (those without are Downtown Berkeley, 
Oakland International Airport, and 19th Street and 12th Street in Downtown Oakland). Despite this, 
or perhaps because of it, BART parking fills to capacity as early as 6am. By 8:45am, many stations 
are at parking capacity, and the system as a whole is at 73% capacity (Phillips, 2016). There is a 
waiting list for parking permits that can reach 3,800 drivers (Richards, 2016). 
BART has several plans for capacity increases with bond measures and the Warm 
Springs/Berryessa extensions. However, BART spokesperson Linton Johnson states that adding 
additional parking will increase vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and greenhouse gases (Phillips, 
2016). Therefore, BART is seeking alternatives, such as building transit-oriented development 
(TOD). TODs will enable transit users to use BART without needing to drive, freeing up spaces 
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for residents commuting from afar. However, two commuters present case studies of how limited 
parking perhaps ironically increases VMT. Jonathon Peacock lives near a BART station that fills 
by 7:40am. He must then drive further to the next station to find parking, or perhaps even drive all 
the way into San Francisco. Likewise, Jessica Morgan lives near another BART station, but often 
has to drive past several other BART stations to find a spot (Phillips, 2016).  
These drivers, and many others, will simply keep driving until either they find a spot or 
they give up on BART and drive all the way to work. Providing TOD will help solve the issue, but 
providing additional parking will help solve the increased VMT resulting from commuters having 
to bypass close stations for farther stations with open spots. Ultimately, a radical change in urban 
planning practices will be necessary to create widespread reductions in VMT, but short of that, 
additional park and ride capacity will help.  
4.1.5.7 Partnering with Rideshare Mobile Applications, an Alternative to More 
Parking Capacity  
Summit, New Jersey, a suburb of New York City, is trying a 21st Century solution to the 
ages-old last mile challenge. By partnering with Uber to offer reduced or even free trips to the 
town’s NJ Transit train station, the city is saving millions of dollars on expanding parking capacity 
(Hawkins, 2016). BART could make similar use of ridesharing applications to increase utilization 
of its stations without the need for expensive parking garages. Like the residents of Summit, BART 
riders might be spurred by cheap fares to and from the station, especially when considered as a 
replacement for paying for a parking permit or split as a carpool.  
AC Transit and WestCAT Lynx could also make use of the program to funnel riders to 
transbay bus nodes, especially given that the bus services largely operate without the aid of park-
and-ride lots. A key bus stop without an attached lot could suddenly become an important part of 
the network as rideshare app users begin to flock to it using the incentive program.  
The program could be coupled with the Clipper fare-card system to further integrate into 
the existing network. This could also prohibit users from cheating the system by taking a subsidized 
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fare to a centrally located transit node, then walking to a local destination rather than getting on 
transit as intended. 
One hazard to keep in mind is the volatile nature of mobile application companies. Uber’s 
financial reports indicate recent losses upwards of $2 billion per year (Smith, 2016). This is most 
likely related to a tactic to squeeze out competition with low prices and driver incentives, but could 
pose long-term problems for an agency relying on Uber if the tactic fails to pan out and the company 
shuts down. 
4.1.6 Strategy 6: Partner with Developers of Ridesharing Mobile Applications 
MTC’s presentation lastly recommends improving on-demand shared mobility through 
partnering with rideshare mobile application (“app”) companies. This ranges from a 
“jitney/minibus” service where private operators pick up groups of commuters from predetermined 
locations using vans or minibuses, to simply coordinating casual carpools among private drivers 
and riders. A series of apps for these services already exist, and are prime for coupling into a public-
private partnership (PPP). 
4.1.6.1 Vanpool/Minibus Apps 
The first category involves apps where the commute vehicle is owned by the app 
developers, including RidePal, Bridj, MagicBus, and Chariot. These companies operate vans and 
minibuses along fixed routes in select cities for prices competitive with public transit on schedules 
oriented towards demand. An example is shown in Figure 4.16. 
As private operators, these companies realize many operating advantages over transit. One 
advantage is less administrative oversight, as the operators only answer to their own corporate 
office and not a pyramid of public agencies and other stakeholders. They also have more flexibility 
in schedule modifications to suit fluctuating demand, as they can add and cull routes without public 
input. Perhaps most of all, they enjoy an absence of rules that can constrict public operators, such 
as the environmental review process that slows down service expansion, public review process that 
slows down service modifications, and many federal regulations. For example, FTA’s Charter Bus 
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Service regulation prohibits transit agencies from providing charter bus service in most instances 
(Federal Transit Administration, 2016). However, private companies are free to provide contracted 
services in addition to public services, and they do. For example, Chariot provides private commute 
services for companies such as Virgin America, Glassdoor, and Whole Foods (Chariot, 2016b). By 
partnering with specific companies, a private operator helps take cars off the road with very 
specifically targeted routes to and from that company at times integrated with the company’s 
schedule. 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Chariot’s Richmond Racer Route (Chariot, 2016a) 
 
However, private operators do have some disadvantages. Primarily, they do not receive the 
recognition that public operators do. For example, a tourist or new resident of San Francisco knows 
there is a public transport system and quickly learns about Muni and BART services. However, 
learning about private operators takes much longer since most operate in only one or two select 
markets. Additionally, public transit providers have marked stops, integrated transit maps, and so 
on, whereas private operators most often use unmarked stops, and maps and schedules that do not 
promote connections to other modes. Lastly, the sluggish process to modify routes that hinders 
public transit agencies assures route consistency over time, whereas private operators could simply 
disappear overnight, stranding workers who organized their commute patterns around the service.  
  79 
 
 
Through a PPP, these companies could bolster their services to include commutes from 
underserved East Bay locations to underserved Peninsula locations. For example, all transbay bus 
services across the bridge terminate at the Transbay Terminal for economy of scale purposes, but 
a vanpool route would have more flexibility to terminate at other locations in San Francisco. This 
could attract riders who forgo public transit due to the lack of direct connections. A PPP also 
legitimizes a private enterprise and ensures stability, which increases the appeal as riders know the 
service will still be there tomorrow. It would also allow the private operators to utilize public transit 
infrastructure, such as bus queue jumps, stations, or ITS technologies. In brief, public partnering 
with private vanpool/minibus operators can help fill holes left by public transit with flexible and 
dynamic service. 
4.1.6.2 Casual Carpool Apps 
The second category of mobile carpool applications involve apps where the driver uses 
their own car and is a free agent to drive only when he or she desires. These apps include Via, 
Scoop, uberPOOL, and Waze Carpool. These operate similarly to the vanpool/minibus apps, but 
are even more dynamic. They enjoy the most flexibility and responsiveness to fluctuating demands, 
but are also typically more expensive to use. A PPP with these apps would mostly promote the rate 
of carpooling, and so is prime for coupling with other carpool incentives, such as queue jumps, 
express lanes, reduced tolls, and other dedicated infrastructure. These apps have a huge potential 
to secure riders who forgo public transit for any number of reasons, from lack of availability to 
concerns over cleanliness, other users, and so on.  
Any PPP with a casual carpool app will need to be certain that the partnership is promoting 
high occupancy rates. If a commuter is forgoing driving alone to be chauffeured alone by a 
rideshare operator, then there will be no improvement in operations. In fact, operations may worsen 
as the rideshare driver doubles back to pick up another fare. To avoid this, incentives to increase 
occupancy past the first passenger will be critical.  
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4.1.7 Strategy 7: Enhanced Casual Carpooling 
As outlined in the literature review, Kalon Kelley proposes an interesting way to 
incentivize casual carpooling. This involves creating a program that distributes RFID beacons to 
passengers and drivers, with incentives for both carpooling in places without HOV infrastructure 
and for filling up with more passengers than the minimum required to access said HOV 
infrastructure.  
Due to the proliferation of phones capable of Bluetooth connections since Kelley’s paper, 
perhaps an enhanced casual carpool system could make use of Bluetooth instead of RFID. Only the 
driver would need a receiver that could identify Bluetooth-enabled phones in the vehicle, and then 
use RFID to transmit passenger information to overhead gantries using existing hardware. This 
could be taken a step further, by being paired with a mobile application that allows rating systems, 
rideshare requests, payment reimbursement, customer support, and so on.  
Since casual carpooling is unregulated, an unofficial set of “guidelines” has been developed 
based on common courtesy (What Are Casual Carpools?, 2016; SF Casual Carpool, 2015). These 
include observing safe practices, minding music and food or drink, and splitting tolls. However, 
one troubling piece of advice offered is “to form as many carpools as possible” (What Are Casual 
Carpools?, 2016). The idea being that since a vehicle only needs three occupants to use HOV 
facilities and pay HOV fares, that casual carpoolers should strive to limit themselves to three per 
vehicle to maximize the number of carpools that can get through. However, this defeats the spirit 
of carpooling, which is to take as many cars off the road as possible by increasing the occupancy 
rate of the remaining vehicles. If there are six people waiting and a driver in an SUV pulls up, why 
shouldn’t they all pile into that one vehicle? If it creates a shortage for the next driver that comes 
along, then that driver should switch to riding. 
Using an enhanced casual carpool system will maximize occupancy per vehicle by 
reducing rates even further the more a vehicle is filled. It would also couple well with a VMT tax, 
as that tax would be split more ways the more occupants are in a vehicle. A rebate system could 
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even be established to refund VMT taxes for miles driven with a full car. Additionally, through 
associating a smartphone app with occupancy, it will be harder to cheat. This is because potential 
cheaters would have to have an entire extra smartphone with the app, or go out of their way to 
purchase an extra fob. Some might, but the majority would be deterred by the extra expense or 
effort.  
The system could also be integrated with existing apps, such as the aforementioned Via, 
Scoop, uberPOOL, and Waze Carpool. If one of these systems is tracking a carpool heading 
towards a toll gantry, the system could automatically apply the same toll rate alterations as towards 
enhanced casual carpoolers. 
Another advantage of the system is that while it could most immediately apply to the Bay 
Bridge Toll Plaza, it could be expanded to include tolls elsewhere, such as onramps, downtown 
cordons, express lanes, and so on. This could lead to increased occupancy not just on the Bay 
Bridge, but elsewhere in the Bay Area. While the Bay Bridge has an average occupancy rate of 
1.54 persons per vehicle, the Bay Area as a whole has an occupancy rate of only 1.08 persons per 
vehicle (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). As Table 4.5 demonstrates, while almost one out of six of 
commuters carpooled, most of those were marginally better than driving alone, at 2 persons per 
car. Only 2.7% of Bay Area commuters made better use of capacity at three or more persons per 
car, for a total occupancy rate of 1.08 persons per vehicle. 
One major pitfall of the enhanced casual carpool idea is penetration. Forcing casual 
carpoolers to adopt this app might cause resentment, or even lower carpool rates as potential 
carpoolers become discouraged by the unfamiliar technology. FasTrak faces a similar problem, as 
evidenced by the 25% of Bay Bridge users that stick to paying by cash (Caltrans, 2015b). 
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Table 4.5: Breakdown of Bay Area Commuters by Mode* 
Mode Percentage 
Car, truck, or van 68.5% 
   Drove alone 59.0% 
   Carpooled 9.6% 
      In 2-person carpool 6.8% 
      In 3-person carpool 1.7% 
      In 4-or-more person carpool 1.0% 
   Workers per car, truck, or van 1.08 
Public Transportation (excluding taxicab) 17.2% 
Walked 4.4% 
Bicycle 2.0% 
Taxicab, motorcycle, or other means 1.7% 
Worked at home 6.1% 
* (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014) 
 
4.1.8 Strategy 8: Shifting Attitudes on Carpooling 
Wang and Chen’s study, outlined in the literature review, provides stark evidence that most 
carpoolers do so without need for incentive. In other words, high occupancy vehicles are so for 
factors other than HOV incentives. Providing HOV infrastructure or toll reductions in areas without 
either have been shown to only increase the rate of carpooling by less than 1% (Wang & Chen, 
2012). Instead, lone drivers in the study switched to carpooling due to attitudinal factors (e.g. being 
swayed by the environmental benefits of carpooling), whereas carpoolers switched to lone driving 
due to structural factors (e.g. increased availability of personal vehicles). Of additional note, 
carpoolers in the study who switched to driving alone perceived carpooling as being harder to 
achieve after switching than when they were actively carpooling, suggesting a cognitive dissonance 
for justifying the switch. 
Pursuant to this research, perhaps a cultural shift would yield better results than additional 
HOV infrastructure. Many people nowadays seem concerned for the environment and the impact 
left on future generations, though perhaps the connection between vehicle occupancy rates and 
environmentalism is not as clear as it could be. An advertisement campaign similar to Flex Alert 
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(power conservation) and Don’t Trash California (litter prevention) could help shift attitudes and 
increase carpooling rates. 
These public awareness programs have proven to be effective at getting the public-at-large 
to adopt more environmentally friendly habits. Flex Alert has been shown to decrease energy usage 
by 1000 MW statewide, the equivalent to around two large power plants or a million households 
(Flex Alert, 2013). Don’t Trash California has been declared a success as well based on trash 
reductions and public perception changes on what constitutes litter, the harm of litter, and the 
acceptableness of littering (County of Los Angeles, 2005). By promoting carpooling in a similar 
manner, a lone driver’s sense of morality towards the environment and future generations can be 
invoked to increase the likelihood of that driver switching to carpooling.  
The Flex Alert program cost $10 million per year in 2013 and 2014, and $11 million in 
2016 (Edson, 2013, p. 5; California Independent System Operator Corporation, 2016). 
Comparatively, adding 1000 MW of capacity is estimated to cost $965 million for natural gas or 
$3,705 million for solar photovoltaic (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2016). And that is 
just to build the plants, never mind the operational costs for labor, maintenance, overhead, and fuel 
(for natural gas). Similarly, promoting carpooling through attitude changes rather than hardscape 
changes has the potential to aid traffic at a fraction of the cost. 
4.1.9 Strategy 9: Increased Enforcement 
Many of the other HOV facilities are under-enforced in the Bay Area. Even the Bay Bridge 
Toll Plaza, perhaps the most enforced facility in the region, reports a 13.5% HOV violation rate 
(Caltrans, 2012, p. 24). This disincentivizes carpooling, as users do not feel pressured into only 
using HOV facilities if they meet the requirements, as well as degrading HOV operations and thus 
reducing the attractiveness of qualifying to use the HOV facilities. This is especially the case in 
San Francisco, where drivers fill all onramp lanes during peak hours, regardless of HOV or general 
purpose designation. Seeing solo drivers using HOV infrastructure leads to resentment among law-
abiding drivers, and it isn’t hard to see how this would then increase the violation rate. After all, if 
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everyone else is doing it, then what is the point of sticking to the slow lanes? Drivers who feel like 
they can cheat the system will no longer feel pressured to organize carpools or stop for casual 
carpoolers, reducing the efficiency of the system. 
To fix this, increased enforcement will help ensure that violations are kept to a minimum. 
The Los Angeles Metro reports that the simple presence of California Highway Patrol (CHP) units 
reduces the HOV violation rate from 24% to 11% (Lazarus, 2014). Perhaps stationing CHP units 
near HOV facilities would help reduce violation rates in the Bay Area as well. 
Another idea for reducing the violation rate comes from the Washington State Department 
of Transportation (WSDOT). They devised a program where drivers could call a hotline and report 
the license plates of HOV violators. However, instead of dealing with the questionable legality of 
tying enforcement into citizen reports, WSDOT simply sends educational materials to the address 
on file for the HOV violator’s license plate. If the report was mistaken, then there is no harm and 
no foul to the falsely accused driver. However, if the driver was in fact cheating the system then 
this gives him or her a wake-up call that others are noticing. A psychologist could speculate if the 
materials actually guilt the offender into reforming or if it is simply shame from being caught, but 
WSDOT reports that most violators stop cheating the system after receiving the educational 
materials. The violation rate in the Puget Sound area of Washington averages less than five percent, 
compared to the national average of ten to fifteen percent (Washington State Department of 
Transportation, 2016). 
Similar to appealing to psychology to increase the rate of carpooling mentioned before, 
perhaps this type of psychological strategy could help curtail the violation rate by altering 
mentalities rather than just behaviors. After all, for some commuters the risk of getting caught and 
fined is simply seen as an “opportunity cost.” One driver in the DC metro area said that she would 
receive dirty looks from the other drivers, but she simply didn’t care (Weiss, 2009). By getting 
these violators to care, the violation rate can be reduced and the HOV infrastructure allowed to 
operate as intended.  
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4.1.10 Strategy 10: Electronic Tolling at the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza 
As mentioned in the previous section, all electronic tolling has already been implemented 
on the Golden Gate Bridge to much success. The basic premise is to replace cash booths with 
cameras that snap a picture of passing license plates and sends the registered owner of the car a bill 
for the toll. FasTrak toll tags would work as they presently do. This would speed up the toll process 
and eliminate delays related to the toll collection process, since drivers would no longer need to 
make a cash transaction. With open road tolling, there would also be no need to slow down, further 
reducing delay. 
4.1.10.1 Golden Gate Bridge Toll Plaza Conversion Case Study 
For the Golden Gate Bridge, converting the existing toll booths to all electronic tolling cost 
$3,237,000 (Dick, Wire, Witt, & Mulligan, 2011, p. 1). This included strategic development, 
design, construction, software, testing, and project management. The estimated savings are $19.2 
million over the first ten years of service (Dick, Wire, Witt, & Mulligan, 2011, p. 4). These savings 
come from a roughly three-quarters reduction in personnel costs, even against a doubling in 
transaction costs, as outlined in Appendix F. 
Converting the toll booths to all electronic tolling is not the end of the story, however. This 
project still left the toll booths in place, which combined with the movable barrier on the Golden 
Gate Bridge has led to an uptick in crashes into the toll booth structure. Speeds on the bridge 
increased from an average of 35 MPH to 50 MPH upon installation of the barrier in January of 
2015, resulting in an increase in the number of booth strikes from less than 10 in 2014, to 84 in 
2015 (Rodriguez, 2016). Each strike costs from $7,000 to $10,000 to replace the one-time-use 
attenuators (“crash buffers”), meaning the increase in crashes is potentially draining $840,000 
annually from the estimated savings. Additionally, each crash takes out a lane or two and can cause 
traffic to back up for hours. Replacing the toll booths with an overhead gantry that would toll drivers 
while enabling them to maintain freeway speeds is estimated to cost between $4 million and $5 
million.  
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Another important facet from the Golden Gate Bridge conversion is how their board of 
directors handled the transition for toll-taking staff. The approach sought to soften the loss of these 
union jobs through a variety of incentive and retraining programs, including career counseling, 
internal hiring, tuition stipends, and extensive severance pay (The International Bridge, Tunnel and 
Turnpike Association, 2014). Perhaps most importantly, the transition was announced early and 
progressed over three years, ensuring toll collectors had plenty of time to plan for the conversion. 
4.1.10.2 Relevance to Bay Bridge Toll Plaza Conversion 
To be conservative, using the $5 million cost figure for replacing four lanes of mainline 
capacity’s worth of toll booths with overhead gantries comes out to $1.25 million per lane of 
mainline capacity. At the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza there are five lanes of mainline capacity, which 
would cost $6.25 million at the Golden Gate Bridge rates. In terms of savings, using the same 
analysis yields a savings of $4.8 million per lane of mainline capacity. For the Bay Bridge, this 
translates to $24 million of savings. 
For additional operational advantages, this proposal should be combined with upcoming 
Section 4.2.2 to create a bidirectional all electronic toll facility. Even though there would not be a 
toll plaza to remove on the eastbound side, it would be conservative to maintain the $1.25 million 
cost estimate per lane of mainline capacity. Since the eastbound direction is not tolled currently, 
there would be no additional savings realized. This creates a total estimated cost of $12.5 million 
and a total estimated savings of $24 million, for a net savings of $11.5 million over ten years. 
One concern with this measure is that increasing the capacity of the toll plaza will not 
increase capacity at the Bay Bridge. Without the plaza, there are still approximately eleven 
westbound lanes of incoming traffic that must merge into five lanes on the bridge. For instance, 
Figure 4.17 depicts the facility at peak congestion, where the toll plaza is operating more efficiently 
than the bridge, leading to queue spillback from the bridge downstream through the toll plaza. 
Eliminating the plaza would not improve flow during this time period. 
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Figure 4.17: Bay Bridge Toll Plaza Congestion (Federal Highway Administration, 2011) 
 
One other consideration is that the HOV lanes are free flowing even during the most 
congested hours, as seen in Figure 4.19 above on either side of the toll plaza. If the toll plaza was 
removed and the bottleneck shifted to the neck of the bridge where all incoming lanes merge down 
to the five that cross the bridge, then the design would need to ensure that the HOV lanes extend 
past this chokepoint. This will allow buses and HOVs to continue receiving queue-jump benefits 
post-conversion, although at the expense of non-HOV operations.  
Lastly, any such transition to all-electronic tolling will need to keep in mind the human 
element – the toll collectors. Like with the Golden Gate Bridge, special care will need to be taken 
to ensure that employees are provided for to the best possible extent. 
4.1.11 Strategy 11: BART Capacity Increases 
As the most used mode during the peak hours, BART serves as an integral part of the 
Transbay corridor. By increasing capacity on BART, more users will elect to take the train over 
driving on the bridge. This can be done by either simply allowing more people on the train, or 
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reducing overcrowding and raising comfort. Increasing capacity can be done in two primary ways: 
improving train capacity and improving station capacity.  
4.1.11.1 Improving Train Capacity 
BART can run a maximum train length of ten cars, but many trains run with less due to 
maintenance requirements, even during peak hours. During the 8:00-8:59am peak hour, 22 
westbound trains arrived at the Embarcadero station. Of these, only eight had ten cars. Thirteen had 
only nine cars, and one had just eight cars. During the 5:15-6:14pm peak hour, 21 eastbound trains 
departed the Embarcadero station. Of these, only seven had ten cars. Again, thirteen had only nine 
cars, and one had just eight cars. By increasing all trains to ten cars, an additional fifteen cars in 
each direction can be serviced during their respective peak hour. This represents an increase in 
capacity of 7.3% for the westbound peak hour and 7.7% for the eastbound peak hour without 
needing to squeeze in any additional trains. This translates to an increase in seat capacity of 1050 
persons, or crush capacity of 3000 persons for each direction. For comparison, the Bay Bridge 
carries around 3,270 westbound private vehicle users per lane during the 8:00-8:59am peak hour, 
and around 2,530 eastbound private vehicle users per lane during the 5:15-6:14pm peak hour. 
Therefore, simply maximizing the length of each existing train is roughly equivalent to adding an 
additional lane to the bridge in terms of capacity.   
BART has ordered a new fleet of trains that will be added to the rolling stock to increase 
the length of all trains. Currently, BART operates 669 train cars, which will be increased to 905 
train cars in 2018 as the new cars arrive and the old cars are slowly phased out. Eventually, the 
entire existing fleet will be replaced and BART will assume a total of 1,081 train cars (BART, 
2016c). This will allow BART to run longer trains that can carry more riders, increasing the comfort 
and attraction of the service. 
  89 
 
 
4.1.11.2 Improving Station Capacity 
However, train capacity is only part of the equation; perhaps equally important is station 
capacity. Many BART platforms are narrow with narrow stairs and escalators. If widened, not only 
could more people fit on the platform, but they could fit more comfortably too.  
As outlined in Appendix G, BART is planning to add saddlebags to the Embarcadero and 
Montgomery Street stations, the two most crowded stations in the system. This will enable 
passengers to board on one side and exit on the other, creating a sense of flow and increasing 
capacity. As it stands, passengers must enter and exit trains on the same side, leading to directional 
conflict. Additionally, the queues for westbound and eastbound trains cross the platform during 
peak hours, leading to a maze of riders and uncomfortable conditions. Figure 4.18 shows the 
overcrowding at the Embarcadero station during peak commute hours.  
 
 
Figure 4.18: Platform Overcrowding Plagues BART During Peak Hours (Jones, 2016) 
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Adding platform-side doors could further reduce discomfort from the wind and noise of 
passing trains. It will also improve safety by preventing riders from accessing the tracks, either for 
suicidal or accidental reasons. Since the mainline is only two tracks, one for each direction, a 
medical emergency such as a passenger on the tracks snarls BART service for hours on end and 
strands many riders. The main problem with this idea is that BART is acquiring new trains with 
three doors rather than two. The positioning of these doors do not exactly match the existing trains, 
presenting problems for platform-side doors. Once BART has fully transitioned to the new trains, 
however, platform-side doors should be implemented to increase comfort and safety, and ultimately 
ridership. 
4.1.12 Strategy 12: Altered BART Service 
Presently, BART trains stop at all stations along an entire route. This means that the busiest 
stations see as many trains as far-less busy stations. From one end of the line to the other, a train 
will stop at every station during every part of the day. This means that the North Concord station’s 
2,800 daily riders receives the same level of service as the Pleasant Hill station’s 7,700 riders 
(BART, 2016d). On the mainline, West Oakland (7,400 daily riders) receives the same service as 
the Embarcadero (49,300) riders. This vast difference in use can be better catered by altering 
BART’s current service patterns, through introduction of skip-stop “metro” service, and express 
trains. 
4.1.12.1 Skip-Stop “Metro” Service 
By switching to a skip-stop schedule, trains schedules would be modified to promote more 
trains between busy stations, and faster trains from the suburbs to downtown cores. This service 
would improve BART service and increase ridership, potentially decreasing congestion on the Bay 
Bridge.  
For example, Montgomery and Embarcadero in San Francisco both have over 46,800 
entries per day, and 12th St and 19th St in Oakland both have over 13,800 entries per day, whereas 
West Oakland only serves 7,400 entries per day (BART, 2016d). Despite this, every train that stops 
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in San Francisco also stops at West Oakland, as do two-thirds of trains coming from downtown 
Oakland (the other third heads south to Fremont rather than west to San Francisco). Allowing every 
other train (or more) to skip West Oakland will improve capacity by reducing the amount of time 
trains spend decelerating into the station, boarding, and accelerating again.  
Expanding this idea to other stations, skip-stop service outside of the San Francisco-
Oakland urban core will allow passengers to access the downtown areas much more quickly, 
improving attraction and ridership. Skip-stop service within the urban core will improve capacity, 
as two adjacent trains can use two adjacent stations as one block. For example, a train at 12th Street 
in Oakland and another at 19th Street in Oakland can then pass West Oakland and simultaneously 
proceed into San Francisco to the Montgomery Street and Embarcadero stations, respectively. In 
other words, one train will proceed straight from 12th Street to Montgomery Street, while the other 
proceeds straight from 19th Street to the Embarcadero. Since these trains will operate concurrently, 
they will not fight each other for headway. As it stands with each train stopping at each station, the 
first one to arrive at the Embarcadero might encounter boarding delays, causing the second one to 
be stuck in the tube. Skip-stop service will reduce the compounding effect this has that leads to 
terrible systematic delays.  
The main advantage of skip-stop service is splitting BART into two service groups (urban 
core and suburban express) that specifically caters to each market. The urban core gets more 
frequent service, and the suburbs get faster trains. However, the main disadvantage is the cost. In 
order to properly implement skip-stop service, new tracks will need to be constructed to allow 
express trains to bypass local trains. Appendix H features MTC’s research into skip-stop service 
for BART. 
4.1.12.2 Express Service 
Less extreme than the skip-stop proposal, but still with great reductions in travel time, is 
implementing express service that takes advantage of existing headway patterns to squeeze in faster 
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trains. This could be used either as a supplement to skip-stop “metro” service to better define the 
suburb express trains, or outright replace the program with a minimally expensive express pattern.  
Research from Tang et al. points to the idea that the most economical way to decrease rail 
transit travel time is not increasing the maximum speed, but rather decrease the instances of reduced 
speeds (Tang, Dick, & Caughron, 2016). As in, eliminating a speed-restricted section of track can 
be far more effective than increasing the maximum speed on the rest of the line. A visual 
demonstration of this concept is provided in Figure 4.19 below. The top chart shows in orange the 
time saved by eliminating a slow portion of track, versus the less time saved by increasing the top 
speed in the bottom chart. 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Time Savings from Eliminating Slow Segments (top) versus Increasing Top Speed 
(bottom) (Tang, Dick, & Caughron, 2016) 
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A surrogate for a slow area of track to improve is an underused station to skip. The Bay 
Area has its own perfect case study of this idea put to the test: Caltrain’s Baby Bullet service. Rather 
than increase speeds through spending hundreds of millions of dollars on grade separation, 
straightened track, control systems, and rolling stock capable of faster speeds, Caltrain elected to 
simply eliminate stations with lower ridership. The Baby Bullet is able to travel between San 
Francisco and San Jose in an hour, versus the Local’s travel time of an hour and a half (Caltrain, 
2016). The Baby Bullet and Local services have the same top speed, but by skipping past most 
stations, the Baby Bullet achieves a one-third reduction in travel time. 
BART could implement a similar system to reduce travel times by skipping less-used 
stations to bring trains in from the suburbs more quickly. By maintaining a top speed, precious 
minutes could be saved and comfort could even be argued to increase by the reduction in 
accelerations and decelerations. While the greatest time savings would require altering existing 
schedules, it would be possible to achieve some travel time reduction by squeezing express trains 
between the headways of existing trains. An express train leaving right before a local train would 
bypass less-used stations until it arrived at the end of the express section just after the prior local 
train. Essentially, the time savings would be equal to the headway between the two local trains 
minus the headway the express train must maintain with the local trains before and after it. Table 
4.6 provides an example of this proposal in action, focusing on the Pittsburg/Bay Point line inbound 
to the Embarcadero in San Francisco. 
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Table 4.6: Express BART Example Schedule 
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373 8:47 8:53 8:57 9:02 9:05 9:10 9:15 9:20 9:23 9:27 9:28 9:33 9:40 53 
Express 9:00   9:13 9:16    9:28  9:32  9:42 42 
375 9:02 9:08 9:12 9:17 9:20 9:25 9:30 9:35 9:38 9:42 9:43 9:48 9:55 53 
 
As can be seen, the express train would shave eleven minutes from the Pittsburg/Bay Point 
to Embarcadero travel time without affecting the local trains before or after it. However, this is just 
a demonstration as other lines join this one at the MacArthur and West Oakland stations. These 
other lines complicate the concept and would require further analysis to circumvent. 
 
4.2 DEMAND MANAGEMENT 
 The second category of strategies for improving operations across the transbay corridor, 
demand management, contains four strategies that focus on shifting demand away from peak 
periods. These include tactics focusing on offsetting Bay Bridge vehicular demand to less impacted 
hours, reducing the need to bring a car to work, and changing the planning landscape of the Bay 
Area. 
4.2.1 Strategy 13: Congestion Pricing 
Presently, the Bay Bridge does charge more during peak hours and less for HOV. However, 
this could be taken further with dynamic pricing that reflects actual roadway conditions. As 
congestion increases, so do prices. This will have two main benefits: prices will better match actual 
congested conditions rather than a set schedule, and prices can more incrementally change, rather 
than having a binary congestion/no congestion price scheme. Additionally, the dynamic pricing 
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would expand upon the existing carpool discount scheme, by offering further discounts to higher 
occupancy carpools rather than a flat discount for all vehicles that meet the minimum requirement. 
4.2.1.1 Congestion Pricing to Offset Demand 
Figure 4.20 features detector occupancy rate data for the months of August and September 
2016. The detector occupancy rate measures how often a vehicle is on top of the detector. In free-
flow conditions, the occupancy rate is less than 5%. In standstill traffic, occupancy can reach 40-
50%. By measuring detector occupancy on either side of the bridge, the level of congestion can be 
determined across the day. The westbound loop detectors, located at postmile 7.7, are the last 
detectors before the toll plaza (Caltrans, 2016g). However, at 2000 feet upstream, they are still far 
back enough to detect congested conditions. The eastbound loop detectors, located at postmile 2.8, 
are less ideal as they are about 3000 feet onto the bridge from San Francisco, but there are no loop 
detectors further west on I-80 that might provide more prudent data (Caltrans, 2016h).  
 
 
Figure 4.20: Detector Occupancy Rates at the Bay Bridge 
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As can be seen, the westbound detector is heavily influenced by the toll plaza, jumping 
over 40% for the 6am and 7am hours when the plaza is at its peak congestion. On the other hand, 
the eastbound detector is downstream of the major chokepoint on the peninsula side, where all of 
the downtown San Francisco traffic crunches onto the bridge, and so reflects smoother conditions. 
However, eastbound congestion is severe enough that the eastbound detector picks it up, despite 
being past the downtown chokepoint. 
At what point do conditions break down and traffic is officially congested? By inspection, 
it seems like the data alternates between around 10% and less during off-peak hours and over 15% 
during peak hours. Therefore, a congestion threshold of 15% was chosen and is represented by the 
dashed red line. This yields congested westbound hours of 5am to 11am and 5pm, and eastbound 
hours of 2pm to 7pm. During these hours, the bridge is at capacity not because of the physical 
constraints on the bridge, but rather because of the chokepoints at either end of the bridge. This 
would explain why the greatest number of vehicles cross the bridge right at the beginning of the 
peak periods before the congestion results in excessive queuing and delays, as discussed in Section 
3.4.1 and demonstrated by Figure 3.8.  
Congestion is not simply present or absent, however; some peak hours are worse than 
others. For example, Figure 4.20 shows that while the westbound direction is congested during the 
5am to 11am hours, the absolute worst congestion is during the 6am and 7am hours. Implementing 
congestion pricing that spikes during these worst-of-the-worst hours could help offset demand to 
less impacted hours. Additionally, since the evening westbound peak only lasts one hour in terms 
of congestion (during the 5pm hour), it should not be too hard to implement congestion pricing to 
convince drivers to cross during the 4pm or 6pm hours instead. 
4.2.1.2 Congestion Pricing to Increase HOV Occupancy 
At present during carpool hours, HOVs are tolled $2.50 versus $6 for non-HOVs. HOVs 
at the toll plaza are defined as motorcycles, low emissions vehicles with appropriate tags, two-
person cars with two persons, and vehicles with at least three persons (FasTrak, 2015). Focusing 
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on the last definition, there is no incentive to fill beyond the minimum three persons. As discussed 
in Section 4.1.7, this creates a counterintuitive etiquette where casual carpool drivers restrict 
themselves to two passengers in order to leave enough passengers for other drivers.  
As discussed in Section 3.1.1, this leads to an occupancy rate of 3.5, barely higher than the 
minimum of three. Considering nearly 20,000 vehicles pass through the toll plaza daily, increasing 
the occupancy rate by one person per car would allow 20,000 more commuters through daily 
without any increases in vehicular demand or roadway capacity. Since on average 44,351 
westbound commuters cross the bay during the 8am peak hour, including those in 2,903 HOVs, 
adding one person per HOV would add 2,903 commuters worth of capacity. This simple addition 
alone would increase the westbound transbay capacity by 6.5% during the 8am peak hour in terms 
of all mode capacity, and 17.8% for private vehicle capacity. 
This extra person per HOV could be realized by incentivizing drivers to go beyond the 
minimum three. Rather than a simple $3.50 discount on toll fare, a stepped discount could be 
implemented with greater discounts for higher occupancy. A capacity of five, the maximum for a 
typical sedan, could receive the ultimate fare discount: no toll whatsoever. This type of discount 
stepping could also apply to low emissions vehicles, giving more efficient vehicles (such as electric 
vehicles) greater discounts over less efficient, but still low emissive vehicles (such as hybrids). 
Two-seaters with two persons would pay the highest discounted fare. This might seem unfair as 
they are at capacity, but a two-seater takes up as much space and so contributes just as much to 
congestion as a sedan and so should be weighted accordingly. A motorcycle could pay the most 
discounted fare, as they consume minimal space and a properly behaved motorcyclist contributes 
minimally to congestion. 
 This stepped discount could be controlled either by Bluetooth or RFID technology as 
described in Section 4.1.7, or through an expansion of the FasTrak Flex program. Currently, 
FasTrak Flex allows riders to denote whether they have one, two, or three occupants in order to 
receive discount express lane fares on I-580. Expanding this to include four, five, or more occupants 
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and tagging the device to a car size and capacity would allow this technology to be implemented 
on the Bay Bridge as prescribed in this section. 
4.2.1.3 Relation of Toll Effectiveness to Parking Fare Rates 
In 1995, 81% of private vehicle commuters parked for free in San Francisco (Shoup, 2002, 
p. 3). While that number has certainly decreased since then due to programs such as the San 
Francisco Commuter Benefits Ordinance of 2009 that requires most employers to incentivize transit 
and vanpool usage for employees, there are still many places on the peninsula that offer free or 
very low cost parking to employees (SF Environment, 2009). When parking is free, many 
commuters consider toll fare to be trivial (A. Fremier, personal communication, September 20, 
2016). This is probably a major factor as to why the 2010 Bay Bridge toll hike had no effect on 
demand (Matier & Ross, 2014). If congestion pricing is to effect change, then it will need to be 
assisted by measures to raise the cost of parking.  
4.2.2 Strategy 14: Eastbound Tolling 
At present, there is only a toll to enter the San Francisco peninsula by bridge. Leaving the 
peninsula avoids all tolls, unless the trip involves another bridge such as the Carquinez Bridge to 
Solano County and beyond. This reduces the incentive to carpool out of the city or avoid the most 
congested hours, other than to make use of East Bay HOV lanes and avoid traffic, respectively. 
Adding on a toll fare element will further discourage people from driving alone and/or during the 
worst hours. Two methods for accomplishing this include creating a toll cordon around downtown 
San Francisco, and converting the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza into a bidirectional facility. 
4.2.2.1 Central Business District Congestion Tolling 
This concept would essentially cordon off downtown San Francisco, with a toll to pass the 
cordon. Similar to congestion pricing, the tax could be reduced or even lifted during non-peak 
hours. The San Francisco County Transportation Authority (SFCTA) has taken a look into this 
concept (San Francisco County Transportation Authority [SFCTA], 2010a). As part of their 
research, SFCTA took a look at the systems in London, the United Kingdom, and Stockholm, 
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Sweden. London charges a flat $13 daily charge to cross the cordon any number of times, and they 
have seen a 30% reduction in traffic, $216 million in toll revenues, and a doubling of downtown 
speeds for remaining drivers. In Stockholm, drivers are charged $1.50 to $3.00 per crossing, and 
the city has seen traffic reduced by 22% and $100 million collected in toll revenues. Both cities 
report increased commercial sales within the cordon due to increased transit funding as transit riders 
and pedestrians have been shown to spend more than private vehicle users (SFCTA, 2010b). 
SFCTA proposes to implement a similar program in San Francisco, cordoning off the 
central business district by tolling traffic crossing Laguna Street, 18th Street, and entering/existing 
US 101, I-80, or I-280 within the cordon. SFCTA has studied several proposals, one of which 
targets outflows from the cordon. Figure 4.21 maps this proposal. This proposal is most relevant to 
this thesis, as it would toll eastbound commuters leaving downtown San Francisco, providing a 
mirror to the toll plaza for westbound commuters. Combining the cordon with congestion pricing 
and HOV discounts would incentivize commuters to continue carpooling and driving off-peak 
throughout the day, rather than just for the morning rush. 
Several key concerns with any cordon program are covered by SFCTA (SFCTA, n.d.). One 
such concern is for drivers who need to cross several times per day, such as parents dropping their 
children off at school or commercial delivery activities. This is allayed by a congestion cap that 
would limit tolls to a single daily fare for any number of crossings, similar to London’s model. 
Another concern is splitting communities, but that could be rectified by “bubbling” the cordon at 
key neighborhoods, allowing residents and businesses right on the line to continue living as they 
are. The overall idea is to disincentivize commuting into downtown San Francisco alone during 
peak hours, not split the city in two. 
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Figure 4.21: SFCTA Proposal for Downtown Outflow Cordon Tolling (SFCTA, 2010a) 
 
4.2.2.2 Convert the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza into a Bidirectional Facility 
When the Bay Bridge first opened in 1936, both levels were bidirectional with the upper 
deck carrying three lanes of cars each way, and the lower deck carrying a lane for buses/trucks each 
way with a third reversible lane, and two tracks for Key System and inter-urban trains. The toll 
plaza, too, was originally bidirectional. In 1963, the bridge was converted to drop all rail traffic, 
integrate buses and trucks with cars, and utilize each level of the bridge for one direction only, and 
the toll plaza switched to only tolling westbound traffic (Caltrans, 2002). The toll plaza conversion 
was done for operational purposes, as there was only real estate for enough lanes to toll in one 
direction with equal capacity to the new configuration on the bridge. Less lanes, and the bridge 
would be under capacity in the westbound direction as the toll plaza would create a bottleneck. 
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In 1974, metering lights were added downstream of the toll plaza to better regulate the 
merging of traffic from 22 lanes to five (Richards, 2015). The arrival of FasTrak further 
necessitated these metering lights, as FasTrak-equipped vehicles can speed past the toll plaza 
without needing to stop, unlike drivers paying with cash. This increased the capacity of the toll 
plaza, while the bridge remained the same. The metering lights help even out the transition in 
capacity. 
Technology has come even further since then, as the Golden Gate Bridge Highway and 
Transportation District has proven with their All Electronic Tolling project (Golden Gate Bridge 
Highway and Transportation District, 2016). While details about this program and its benefits will 
be covered in the next section, the relevant part to this section is that the toll plaza can handle up to 
four lanes of incoming traffic with eight lanes through the toll facility. This demonstrates a two-to-
one ratio for all electronic tolling to mainline capacity. 
At the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza, there are 20 westbound and nine eastbound lanes, for 29 total 
lanes. On the bridge, this is reduced to ten total lanes. For bidirectional tolling at a capacity ratio 
similar to the Golden Gate Bridge Toll Plaza, the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza will need 20 lanes total, 
ten in each direction. Since there are currently 29 lanes of width available, this should not be a 
problem. 
The advantage of bidirectional tolling is the same as outflow cordoning of downtown San 
Francisco, in that it applies the HOV and off-peak incentives of the westbound direction to the 
eastbound direction. One thing bidirectional tolling does better, though, is that it catches all traffic 
crossing the bridge, whereas the downtown cordon would not catch traffic originating from outside 
the cordon and crossing the bridge. While a big component of congestion on the Bay Bridge is from 
downtown San Francisco, many vehicles originate from elsewhere in the city or further down on 
the peninsula. 
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4.2.3 Strategy 15: Changing Corporate Cultures 
Office workers are a prime candidate for congestion reduction due to their flexible work 
conditions. While most white-collar workers are office-based, some are not including teachers, 
reporters, and members of the clergy. These workers usually have much stricter work environments 
that are not flexible. For instance, a reporter cannot do a field visit from home, nor can a teacher 
shift class hours to take advantage of shoulder commute periods. Likewise, blue-collar workers 
almost by definition must exert intense physical labor, so must stick to schedules outside their 
control (such as a factory itinerary or daylight hours). Lastly, the schedule of retail workers is 
essentially set by the shopping public, so altering their commute patterns is no trivial matter. All 
told, the most flexible employment group are office-based workers, and so they should be the target 
of efforts to change corporate cultures to reduce congestion. 
San Francisco has a sizable office-based workforce due to the large number of financial 
and technological (“tech”) companies present. Financial institutions include 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, Grant Thornton, Wells Fargo, and 
Charles Schwab. Tech companies include Zynga, Airbnb, Twitter, Uber, Lyft, Fitbit, Digg, Reddit, 
Chegg, Prezi, Square, and Salesforce. Other industries are present, such as Dolby and Lucasfilm 
representing the movie industry, Banana Republic, Gap Inc., and Levi Strauss representing the 
apparel industry, Kaiser Permanente and Dignity Health representing the healthcare industry, and 
PG&E and Recology representing the utility industry. On the public side, large employers include 
the City and County of San Francisco, UC San Francisco, and the San Francisco Unified School 
District. Some of the largest office-based employers in San Francisco are listed in Table 4.7 below. 
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Table 4.7: Large Office-Based Employers in San Francisco 
Company San Francisco Employees 
Wells Fargo 8,200 
Gap Inc.* 6,000 
Salesforce 5,780 
Twitter Inc. 2,000 
Uber Technologies Inc. 1,980 
Yelp Inc. 1,717 
Google Inc. 1,500 
Lending Club 1,305 
LinkedIn Corp. 1,250 
Lucasfilm Ltd. 1,200 
Autodesk Inc. 1,200 
Adobe Systems Inc. 1,150 
Cisco Systems Inc. 1,050 
Square Inc. 1,000 
(Reyes, 2016; Cooper, 2014) 
* Includes both retail and office employees 
 
4.2.3.1 Promote Telecommuting 
For many office workers in San Francisco, it is possible to get an entire day of productivity 
done from home. This is known colloquially as “telecommuting.” If a business could be convinced 
to let their employees perform some work from home, then the number of commutes that business 
generates will be reduced. 
Many businesses oppose work-from-home practices because it is harder to enforce 
productivity out of the office, and often in-person meetings are necessary to facilitate business 
operations. Likewise, many employees are not great candidates for conversion to fully 
telecommuting for these reasons. However, allowing or even encouraging employees to 
occasionally work from home will reduce commute loads. The companies listed in Table 4.9 above 
represent over 35,000 workers alone. If every employee was allowed to take one day every two 
weeks to telecommute, that would reduce the number of commuters from these offices by an 
average of 3,500, or 10%, daily (assuming a five day workweek). For comparison, recall from 
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Section 4.4.1 that during the westbound all-commute peak hour of 8:00am-8:59am, the Bay Bridge 
carries 3,270 private vehicle users per lane.  
Obviously the situation is more complex than this simple comparison. These newfound 
telecommuters would not all have commuted during one hour on one mode, but rather spread across 
the morning peak by a variety of modes. Additionally, many commuters come from the south up 
the peninsula, from the north across the Golden Gate, or from within San Francisco itself, rather 
than crossing the Transbay Corridor. Lastly, not all of these office employees would be able to 
work from home. While they are typically more flexible than other white-collar workers or blue-
collar and retail workers as discussed above, there are still many office workers who have to be in 
the office, such as receptionists and high-level executives. On the other hand, the list covers only 
fourteen companies, when there are over 116,000 in San Francisco (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). 
Additionally, while many public employees have inflexible work demands, there are certainly 
plenty who can occasionally telecommute among the 25,000 City and County of San Francisco 
employees, 20,000 UCSF employees, or employees of other public agencies (Cooper, 2014). 
In order to increase the rate of telecommuting, the employers themselves will need to be 
convinced of its benefits other than simply reducing San Francisco’s commute load. Simple savings 
appeals might help, such as emphasizing that work-from-home employees do not contribute to 
electricity, water, and food bills, nor do they need many IT functions (if the internet is down, that 
is the employee’s problem). Also, two employees can work in the space of one if each works from 
home half of the time, reducing office real estate needs. However, codification might be necessary 
to effect real change. One possible avenue is an addendum to the 2009 San Francisco Commuter 
Benefits Ordinance. Currently, the ordinance prescribes that all businesses in San Francisco with 
more than 20 employees nationwide must offer direct subsidies or pre-tax deductions for transit or 
vanpools, or provide transit or vanpool service for employees themselves (SF Environment, 2009). 
Adding an alternative for telecommuting would bolster the rate of working from home, and thus 
outright reduce the overall number of commuters. 
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4.2.3.2 Changing Workplace Car Demands 
Another reason many office employees drive to work because they need to have their car 
accessible for work activities, such as meeting with clients. These commuters cannot plan to take 
transit in case they have an impromptu client meeting. Additionally, carpooling with others is 
avoided because the potential passenger has the same concern. This leads to many client-focused 
employees to drive themselves for structural reasons that are not affected by promoting transit or 
carpooling.  
In order to reduce the congestion burden of these workers, appealing to the structural 
inflexibility of why they must drive alone will be necessary. Since the problem is that they must 
have a car at work, the solution is obviously to provide a car at work. Incentivizing or simply 
promoting car-sharing programs such as Zipcar or Carma City CarShare will allow these workers 
to keep their cars at home and either carpool or take transit to work. If they find that they need a 
car to drive out to a client, they can take a company-sponsored shared car.  
Using car-sharing programs can even be competitive. Zipcar bills businesses starting at 
$10 per hour, which includes insurance and gas (Zipcar, 2016). For comparison, the reimbursement 
rate for driving is $0.54 per mile, which includes car depreciation, insurance, gas, and other 
maintenance expenses (Internal Revenue Service, 2015). At nineteen miles driven per hour, the two 
break even. Zipcar also offers direct billing service, which can reduce overhead from receipt 
accounting and paperwork. 
Another way to reduce the need to bring personal cars to work is to promote ride-sharing 
programs (e.g. Uber, Lyft, etc.). These can be competitive if the client meeting is close to the office 
and potentially lengthy. This is because unlike a personal car or a Zipcar, rideshares do not need to 
factor in parking costs. Overall, promoting or going as far as incentivizing car-sharing and ride-
sharing can help office workers who need to drive to clients break free from having to drive to 
work. 
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4.2.4 Strategy 16: Land-Use Planning Changes 
For the sake of sustainability, before considering cars, transit, or anything else, one must 
consider land-use planning. Simply put, the best way to reduce commuter congestion is to bring 
the commuter residences closer to their workplaces. By promoting additional housing in San 
Francisco, and workplace relocation to the East Bay, entire swaths of Transbay commuters could 
be eliminated. 
MTC realizes this, and includes “distributing total housing growth numbers to… job-rich 
cities” as a key component of the “Plan Bay Area” regional transportation plan for 2013-2040 
(MTC, 2013). The process has already begun, with developments such as housing in the South of 
Market and Mission Bay districts of San Francisco and office space in the East Bay community of 
San Ramon (Li, 2016). An advertisement for an apartment community in downtown San Francisco 
promoting living near work and walking is presented in Figure 4.22.  
Another important change in land-use planning is the densification of the neighborhoods 
near BART and other transit stations. BART has made great inroads with projects such as the 
MacArthur TOD, but even more will be required to stem the tide of increasing transbay commute 
demands (MacArthur Station, 2014). Locating offices as well near BART stations outside of San 
Francisco and downtown Oakland will help reduce peak transbay demands by enabling workers to 
“reverse commute” out of San Francisco and Oakland to the rest of the East Bay, or avoid the tube 
altogether by living in the East Bay. 
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Figure 4.22: Advertisement for Walking to Work 
 
An illustration of this concept is provided in Figure 4.23. The data consists of peak four 
hour counts for riders by mode in both directions, 6:00am to 10:00am and 3:30pm to 7:30pm. By 
comparing the peak counts (morning for westbound and evening for eastbound) and the off-peak 
counts (vice versa), the difference in ridership can be determined. In other words, comparing how 
many people cross the Bay into San Francisco in the morning versus the evening, and vice versa 
for those leaving San Francisco, can reveal how much capacity is unused by the directional 
imbalance. As it turns out, 87,193 more persons cross the Bay into San Francisco in the morning 
than the evening, and 86,018 more persons leave San Francisco across the Bay in the evening than 
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the morning. Taking the lower number, this means that roughly 86,000 commuters could be 
accommodated with no changes to existing capacity by building their housing on the peninsula and 
work places in the East Bay.  
As it stands, many BART stations are located in sprawling suburbs, and perhaps 
accordingly are the least-utilized. Excluding the Oakland International Airport station, the stations 
with the lowest ridership are: North Concord with 2,796 daily exits, Castro Valley with 3,017 daily 
exists, and South Hayward with 3,149 daily exits (BART, 2016d). The surrounding communities 
of these stations are all characterized by low density detached housing and businesses surrounded 
by ample surface parking. Adding both residential and commercial TOD will enable BART 
commuters to continue to BART from home to work without needing to use the Transbay Tube in 
the peak direction during peak hours, as well as attracting new riders and thus taking cars off the 
East Bay highways.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.23: Peak vs. Off-Peak Demand by Mode in the Westbound (a) and Eastbound (b) 
Directions 
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While it would be excellent to implement all sixteen proposed strategies for tackling 
congestion across the transbay corridor, limited funding and other constraints restrict what can be 
done. To that end, each strategy has been evaluated for merit in Section 5.1, plotted in terms of cost 
versus benefits in Section 5.2, and ranked in order of priority in Section 5.3. 
 
5.1 STRATEGY EVALUATION 
 Each multi-part strategy has been split into its constituent parts. Each of these parts has 
been assessed for cost and effectiveness, either in terms of capacity increase or demand offset. 
Some elements are able to be directly quantified. However, most require some level of estimation. 
To this end, a series of bins has been devised to help sort the strategies while keeping estimates at 
an appropriately high level. For cost, this is binned as less than $500,000, $500,000 to $1,000,000, 
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000, $5,000,000 to $10,000,000, $10,000,000 to $50,000,000, $50,000,000 
to $100,000,000, and greater than $100,000,000. There is also a “net gain” bin for the select few 
projects that will directly pay for themselves, either through increased revenues or decreased costs. 
Specific benefits are outlined in each subsection, but for comparison they are binned as no benefit, 
minimal benefit, some benefit, great benefit, and extensive benefit. 
5.1.1 Strategy 1: Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards 
Since this proposal only requires paint and inlet modifications, but offers important peak 
time savings for transit and HOVs, the value of this proposal is high and therefore should receive 
high priority. The base proposal (extending the existing HOV ramp to the I-580 eastbound onramp) 
offers the best time savings and is a prerequisite for the two extensions. These two extensions, from 
the I-580 eastbound onramp to the Maritime Street intersection and past the intersection, are not 
required for the base proposal to function, but queues from the plaza do spill back as far as the 
second extension during the worst commute hours, and so they should still be considered.  
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The cost of this element is estimated to be $3,000,000. This places the strategy in the 
$1,000,000 to $5,000,000 bin. In terms of benefit, MTC estimates 11 minutes of travel time savings 
for the nineteen existing and eight proposed buses that use this onramp during the morning peak 
hour (MTC, 2011, p. 8). The existing buses carry around 490 riders between Routes O, OX, S, and 
W that all utilize the West Grand Avenue onramp. Eleven minutes saved for each of these riders 
translates to 90 person-hours saved every day. These routes have a capacity of around 1000 riders, 
meaning they are operating at 49% capacity. If saving eleven minutes incentivizes another 10% to 
ride, that would add 49 riders just during the one peak hour. Additionally, this is only considering 
transit ridership, but carpooling would see a boon here as well. Therefore, all three components of 
this strategy together are considered to have great benefit. 
5.1.2 Strategy 2: HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville 
This proposal involves three key components: adding a right-side HOV lane to westbound 
I-80, converting the Powell Street to westbound I-80 ramp to HOV only and adding access from 
other directions, and adding a park-and-ride lot underneath I-80 at Powell Street. The first 
component is split into two alternatives: the cheaper but operationally worse component that 
converts the right-most existing lane to HOV only, and the more expensive but operationally better 
component that reroutes the new HOV lane onto the existing Powell Street onramp and builds a 
new lane on the outside of the existing junction, connecting back in before the toll plaza.  
5.1.2.1 Convert the Right Lane of I-80 to HOV 
For the first component, due to the expenses and operational headaches of implementing 
an HOV lane across the West Frontage Road onramp, it is recommended that the right-side HOV 
lane should only start with the converted Powell Street onramp, and not further upstream. Transit 
vehicles from further north than Powell Street should use the frontage road to access the HOV lane 
from the modified intersection at Powell Street and West Frontage Road. From there, simulation 
software and further analysis should be used to determine whether or not the mainline freeway can 
operationally handle being reduced from three general purpose lanes to two during HOV hours. If 
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so, then the cheaper alternative of converting the right-most lane should be utilized. If not, then 
further study of constructing a new bypass lane on the outside of the interchange should be assessed. 
Either way, no HOV lane should be constructed before the Powell Street onramp.  
The cost of the cheaper alternative to convert the rightmost lane to HOV is estimated to be 
$165,000, which means it is binned as less than $500,000. On the other hand, the more expensive 
new lane construction is more than five times greater, at $848,500, or in the $500,000 to $1,000,000 
bin. Either way, the queue to be jumped is roughly the same length as Strategy 1’s West Grand 
Avenue queue jump and so could see a similar eleven minute savings. 1,126 morning peak hour 
riders would make use of this on AC Transit routes C, F, FS, G, H, J, L, LA, LC, and Z, WestCAT 
Lynx, for a time savings of 207 person-hours. Capacity on these routes during the peak hour is 
2,107 riders, meaning the buses are currently at 53%. A 10% boost in ridership from the time 
savings would yield an additional 113 riders. Countless additional HOVs and transit riders outside 
the peak hour would also make use of this improvement. Therefore, this element is considered to 
have great benefit for the cheaper alternative, while the more expensive alternative is to be sidelined 
due to expense and environmental concerns. 
5.1.2.2 Powell Street Onramp Conversion to HOV and Adding More Movements 
to Access the Onramp 
The second component, the Powell Street onramp conversion to HOV, should be pursued 
as a way to increase the use of this otherwise superfluous onramp and take advantage of the 0.8 
mile queue jump it offers. According to past research, this conversion will cost $1,248,000 and 
have a time-savings benefit of $6,468,000, for a cost-benefit ratio of 5.18 (AECOM, 2012). This 
places the cost in the $1,000,000 to $5,000,000 bracket. 
 In terms of benefit, while a 5.18 ratio is great, further clarification can be useful. 
With rerouting to utilize the onramp, the 1,126 riders from the previous section would also make 
use of this queue jump. The length of queue skipped from this element is greater than either the 
previous element or the West Grand Avenue queue jump, but for the sake of being conservative 
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the same eleven minute time savings value will be used. This yields an additional 207 person-hours 
during the morning peak hour alone for transit riders, as well as time savings benefits for HOV 
users and transit riders outside the peak hours. It is not likely that the ridership boost from this 
element would be independent of the previous element, as some overlap would occur, but an 
estimated additional 5% ridership boost would yield 56 riders. All told, this element is estimated 
to have great benefit. 
5.1.2.3 Park-and-Ride Lot 
For the last component (the park-and-ride lot), the benefit is not particularly worth the 
expense. While this is a prime location in the greater regional analysis for a park-and-ride lot, 72 
spots will not have a great impact on congestion. Operationally, the lot would be more worthwhile 
if it could be expanded across the street to add hundreds of more spaces, but this would require 
paving over the McLaughlin Eastshore State Park, a sensitive nature reserve.  
In terms of cost, this lot is estimated to cost $494,000, barely binning it as less than 
$500,000. For benefit, 72 vehicles (most likely single-occupancy) could use the lot to group into 
carpools or board transit. While 72 users, or even 80 or 90 to account for two-person vehicles using 
the lot is not insignificant, it is also a daily value, so the peak hour would see even less. Most likely, 
the lot would fill up during the earliest commute hours (e.g. 5am), meaning the lot will have zero 
impact on peak congestion. Overall, this element is considered to have minimal benefit. 
5.1.2.4 Overall Recommendation 
All in all, the most recommended components of this strategy include converting the 
Powell Street onramp to HOV only, adding a left turn from Powell Street westbound onto the 
onramp, adding a through movement from West Frontage Road onto the onramp, and extending 
the now-HOV only lane from where the onramp merges onto westbound I-80 to the existing HOV 
lanes closer to the toll plaza. These components are all highly recommended due to the high cost-
benefit ratio they offer. 
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5.1.3 Strategy 3: MacArthur Onramp Bus Lane 
BATA’s proposal to add an HOV onramp from MacArthur to I-580 west to the toll plaza 
is highly recommended as a way to promote carpooling and increase transit accessibility to the 
bridge. Building upon this proposal by extending the HOV lane to the existing toll plaza HOV lane 
will vastly improve this proposal by allowing buses and HOVs to jump the toll plaza queue on I-
580. 
The cost is estimated to be around $11,117,500, or on the low end of the $10,000,000 to 
$50,000,000 bin. The benefit is estimated around $13,340,000 (AECOM, 2012). More specifically, 
a time-savings similar to the West Grand Avenue and Powell Street queue jumps can be expected. 
While no transit service use this path as a direct connection does not exist, future reroutes that use 
this queue jump could service the nearby neighborhoods, attracting new riders. Therefore this 
strategy is considered to have some benefit. 
5.1.4 Strategy 4: Expand Bus Service 
This recommendation includes expanding bus service for three East Bay agencies: AC 
Transit, WestCAT, and SolTrans.  
5.1.4.1 AC Transit 
For AC Transit, the $27.8 million ($10-$50 million bin) bus replacement and pilot 
programs will help increase ridership. Exactly how much is to be determined, but MTC’s study 
purports that it is worthwhile, and so pursuing this program is recommended (MTC, 2011). This 
element is estimated to have some benefit, as eight new peak hour buses could service around 460 
new riders. At the current 49% occupancy for the routes through the pilot program study area, this 
translates to 223 new riders during the morning peak hour. Additionally, the new buses will inspire 
additional ridership. Therefore, this element is considered to have great benefit. 
5.1.4.2 WestCAT 
For WestCAT, it is highly recommended to alter the Lynx and 30Z routes to create one 
route that connects Hercules and Martinez to San Francisco with express freeway-based service, 
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and a local route that circulates around Hercules. Combined with a frequency increase for the 
express service, this should see increased ridership thanks to faster and more reliable service that 
makes more connections to existing lines. 
Since the only changes are reroutes, the only costs will be changing signage, training 
drivers, and advertising the changes to riders. This all should cost less than $500,000, the smallest 
cost bin. For benefit, if this streamlining sees an additional 20% ridership, that would mean 117 
more riders across the day. This will help increase the daily occupancy rate from 15.7% to 18.9%. 
Not the greatest, but would help improve the Lynx’s farebox recovery ratio in addition to taking 
plenty of cars off the road. Therefore, this element is considered to have some benefit. 
5.1.4.3 SolTrans 
Regarding SolTrans, expansion of Route 200 is not recommended due to its nature of 
providing WETA capacity relief, as well as the old age of the buses. Instead, WETA should focus 
on acquiring additional ferries and improving its water-based service. As well, SolTrans should 
focus as planned on increasing the efficiency and frequency of existing services to the El Cerrito 
Del Norte and Walnut Creek BART stations. 
Since there is no detailed expansion of Route 200 and all signs point to scrapping the route 
anyhow, this automatically places this element in the lowest priority category without needing to 
be charted on a cost-benefit matrix. 
5.1.5 Strategy 5: Commuter Parking 
This strategy proposes seven new park-and-ride lots, three by MTC and four by this thesis.  
5.1.5.1 I-80 and Buchanan Street 
 This lot, proposed by MTC, is estimated to cost $1,838,000 ($1-$5 million bin) and provide 
268 stalls. Due to its central location to I-80 with plenty of transit access, it is anticipated to see 
high use and thus garners some benefit.  
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5.1.5.2 I-880 and Fruitvale Avenue 
 This lot, proposed by MTC, is estimated to cost $1,865,500 ($1-$5 million bin) and provide 
272 stalls. Due to its central location to I-880 with plenty of transit access, including the two 
proposed AC Transit pilot projects, it is anticipated to see high use and thus garners some benefit.  
5.1.5.3 I-880 and High Street 
 This lot, proposed by MTC, is estimated to cost $1,097,500 ($1-$5 million bin) and provide 
160 stalls. Due to its central location to I-880 with plenty of transit access, including the two 
proposed AC Transit pilot projects, it is anticipated to see high use and thus garners some benefit.  
5.1.5.4 I-580 and Fairmont Drive/Foothill Boulevard 
 This proposed lot, original to this thesis, is estimated to cost $754,500 ($500,000-
$1,000,000 bin) and provide 110 stalls. Due to its central location to I-580 with plenty of existing 
transit access, it is anticipated to see high use and thus garners some benefit. 
5.1.5.5 I-580 and Golf Links Road/98th 
 This proposed lot, original to this thesis, is estimated to cost $1,193,500 ($1-$5 million 
bin) and provide 174 stalls. Due to its central location to I-580 with minimal need for transit 
rerouting, it is anticipated to see high use and thus garners some benefit. 
5.1.5.6 SR-24 and Telegraph Avenue/56th Street 
 This proposed lot, original to this thesis, is estimated to cost $583,000 ($500,000-
$1,000,000 bin) and provide 85 stalls. It is centrally located to the SR-24 freeway, but lacks transit 
access and so it is anticipated to see little use and thus garners minimal benefit. 
5.1.5.7 I-580 and Broadway/Piedmont Avenue 
 This proposed lot, original to this thesis, is estimated to cost $1,371,500 ($1-$5 million 
bin) and provide 200 stalls. Due to its poor access to the freeway and lack of San Francisco-bound 
transit services, it is anticipated to see low use and thus garners no benefit. 
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5.1.5.8 BART Parking Capacity Increases 
 BART parking is very scalable. It could be adding in a small surface lot near a far-flung 
station, or adding hundreds of spots in a garage near the urban core. A prudent estimate would be 
$50 million to $100 million, which would pay for a few garages in key locations. At $18,599 per 
stalls for a new parking garage, this would translate to 2,688 to 5,376 stalls (Cudney, 2015). While 
not all of the occupants of these new spots would head to San Francisco, nonetheless adding BART 
parking capacity can be assumed to have some benefit for the transbay commute. 
5.1.5.9 Partner with Ridesharing Apps for Station Access 
 As shown in the Summit, New Jersey case study, the city opted to forgo building a new 
parking garage and instead subsidize Uber rideshare fares to the station for $167,000 per annum 
(Hawkins, 2016). This was a wise move, as a new parking garage can cost upwards of $12 million 
(Gordian, 2013). The Summit station has a daily ridership of 3,638, comparable to many BART 
stations in the outer suburbs (NJ Transit, 2012, p. 28). If BART was to implement a similar program 
at several stations with similar ridership, it would cost somewhere between $500,000 and 
$1,000,000. By enabling additional riders to access the stations without needing to add parking 
capacity, this element can have great benefit. 
5.1.5.10 Overall Recommendation 
All three MTC lots are recommended, as they add 700 stalls of capacity in three key 
locations. Of the proposed lots in this thesis, three are recommended. In order of decreasing 
importance, these are: I-580 and Fairmont Drive/Foothill Boulevard, I-580 and Golf Links 
Road/98th, and SR-24 and Telegraph Avenue/56th Street. These are ordered as such due to 
decreasing access to existing transit and ease of implementation. The one lot not recommended is 
at I-580 and Broadway/Piedmont Avenue. Despite being the largest and in a key location, poor 
freeway connections diminish the effectiveness of this lot. Additionally, the land has existing use, 
versus the other sites that are currently empty, undeveloped lots. 
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Outside of the above lots, it is also recommended that BART increase parking capacity in 
order to better serve existing riders who often have to drive to multiple stations to find a spot, 
hurting the greenhouse gas reduction mission of the service. 
Lastly, this strategy closes out with a recommendation to partner with mobile ridesharing 
applications to assist getting riders to the stations. The case study provided exemplifies how such 
a system can greatly improve transit accessibility without having to spend millions on expensive 
parking garages. 
5.1.6 Strategy 6: Partner with Developers of Ridesharing Mobile Applications 
Through partnering with vanpool/minibus apps and casual carpool apps, public agencies 
can help supplement their bus service with flexible transit options. Each of these elements most 
likely costs around $500,000 to $1,000,000 to implement and maintain, based on similar 
experiences elsewhere (Victoria Transport Policy Institute, 2015). Partnering with vanpool/minibus 
apps offer great benefit, as it can drastically increase occupancy rates by providing direct vanpool 
and minibus service between a specific workplace and the homes of its employees. Partnering with 
casual carpool apps would have minimal benefit, however, due to the lower capacities of casual 
carpools versus vanpools and minibuses. Additionally, partnerships casual carpool apps could lead 
to increased VMT, as drivers are encouraged to circle back and pick up more riders, incurring a 
deadhead trip. 
5.1.7 Strategy 7: Enhanced Casual Carpooling 
In Kelley’s original research, it is determined that an enhanced casual carpooling program 
would theoretically cost $2.7 million per year to operate, placing this strategy in the $1 million to 
$5 million bin (Kelley, 2007). The program would likely see some benefit, as carpoolers seek to 
increase their occupancy and thus lower tolls. However, as much as this strategy would help 
increase carpool occupancy rates, it would be difficult to implement as it would require all users to 
adopt the program in order to function. Therefore, it is recommended to pursue this strategy, but 
not at the expense of other easier-to-implement strategies. 
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5.1.8 Strategy 8: Shifting Attitudes on Carpooling 
Promoting carpooling as the environmentally and socially conscious choice has been 
proven to be far more effective than physical HOV improvements or other incentives (Wang & 
Chen, 2012). Such a campaign would be much cheaper as well. As discussed in Section 4.1.8, Flex 
Alert, a similar government outreach program, costs around $10 to $11 million annually. Assuming 
a similar cost for a promotional ad campaign, this strategy is binned in the $10 to $50 million 
bracket, albeit at the lower end of the estimate. However, for this value extensive benefit can be 
drawn for a fraction of the cost of other HOV improvements that are less effective. Due to the low 
cost and high value, this strategy is highly recommended. 
5.1.9 Strategy 9: Increased Enforcement 
Adding patrols to HOV facilities will reduce the rate of violation (Lazarus, 2014). 
However, this can be costly, detract officers from more pressing matters, and create a culture of 
“us-verse-them” that causes violators to resent officers rather than reconsider their actions. A far 
more effective strategy would be to implement a program like WSDOT’s citizen reporting system 
that lets violators know they are being noticed, and gain compliance through shaming rather than 
punishment. 
5.1.9.1 Adding HOV Facility Patrols 
 As this tactic would mostly be diverting existing officers, the cost is estimated to be 
minimal. Some cost could be occurred though if adding officers to the service is deemed necessary. 
This element is expected to cost less than $500,000 either way. However, it is estimated to have 
minimal benefit, as it would only work when officers are around and create resentment as discussed 
above. 
5.1.9.2 Citizen Reporting System 
 This tactic would require signage, advertising, and overhead for a small taskforce to 
implement. These together could cost around $500,000 to $1,000,000, and offer extensive benefit 
  120 
 
 
similar to the experience of WSDOT, whose system reports half the violation rate of the national 
average (Washington State Department of Transportation, 2016).  
5.1.10 Strategy 10: Electronic Tolling at the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza 
The Golden Gate Bridge Toll Plaza has shown that converting their toll booths to all 
electronic tolling can pay huge dividends. Further, removing the now-empty toll booths in favor of 
a non-obstructive toll gantry will further save the toll plaza money. The Bay Bridge Toll Plaza 
would do well to follow suit.  
In terms of dollars, the conversion is expected to cost $6,250,000 to implement, but will 
save $24,000,000 for a net gain of $17,750,000 using methodology from Section 4.1.10.2. This 
means this project will yield a net gain upon implementation. It will have some benefit, by 
decreasing toll delays during most hours. However, it will have minimal effect during the worst 
peak times, as traffic is congested through the toll plaza, not just at it. As well, any design removing 
the toll plaza will need to maintain the effectiveness of the HOV lanes by extending them past the 
chokepoint, lest buses and HOVs lose their queue-jump incentive.  
5.1.11 Strategy 11: BART Capacity Increases 
To increase the overall capacity of BART, both train and station capacity will need to be 
increased.  
5.1.11.1 Improve Train Capacity 
Maximizing the train capacity across the peak hour will require 15 additional train cars. 
While adding an extra car or two per train has minimal operational costs, additional maintenance 
costs will be incurred from keeping the extra fifteen cars online, rather than retiring them once 
BART’s new cars enter service. BART’s operational expenses related to maintenance and 
electricity for train propulsion amount to around $605.3 million annually (BART, 2014b, pp. 4-
11). Across 669 revenue cars, this yields $904,783 spend per car annually. For fifteen cars kept in 
service at this expense, a net cost of around $13,800,000 is obtained, placing this element in the 
$10 million to $40 million bin. For this cost, an additional seat capacity of 1,050 riders and crush 
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capacity of 3,000 riders is added just during the peak hour. Since for the price, these cars would be 
operational as often as any other car, not just during the peak hour, they could be used other times 
as well, further increasing capacity and comfort. Therefore, this tactic will have extensive benefit 
upon implementation. 
5.1.11.2 Improve Station Capacity 
 This element is expected to cost $449,300,000 (AECOM, 2012, p. 31) to improve the 
Montgomery and Embarcadero Stations, which places it well into the greater than $100 million bin. 
Adding station capacity will have extensive benefit by greatly reducing platform crowding during 
peak periods and increasing pedestrian flow within the station. However, this approach is more 
long-term, as it will take years to be designed and implemented. 
5.1.12 Strategy 12: Altered BART Service 
This strategy features two methods that could work in tandem to improve travel times on 
BART: skip-stop “metro” service and express service. Both should be actively pursued, but the 
express service can be implemented today while the skip-stop service is evaluated, designed, 
constructed, and implemented. Once the necessary infrastructure has been built to accommodate 
skip-stop service, then it could either replace or enhance the express service. 
5.1.12.1 Skip-Stop “Metro” Service 
 An exact cost estimate would require analysis of need for and cost of station bypasses. 
These bypasses are needed to allow trains to skip past others. However, it can be said that the cost 
will be in the largest bin, over $100 million, as it will require a large capital expense for new bridges 
or tunnels for the bypass tracks in several locations. The benefit will be extensive, though, as this 
proposal drastically decreases trip times, which improve appeal and thus ridership. Additionally, it 
is expected that this service will be mandatory to keep up with demand once it surpasses 500,000 
daily riders (AECOM, 2012, p. 33). 
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5.1.12.2 Express Service 
 Implementing the express service proposal is anticipated to cost $5 million to $10 million 
for signage, outreach, overhead, and design. Since Caltrain implemented the Baby Bullet, daily 
ridership has increased 143% (Caltrain, 2015, p. 3). This service is obviously not comparable to 
what BART would be able to implement, due to the contrasting nature of the Caltrain and BART 
services. However, even a 5% increase in ridership for BART would mean 11,700 additional 
transbay riders, yielding great benefit for the system as drivers are taken off the road. 
5.1.13 Strategy 13: Congestion Pricing 
Implementing congestion pricing is anticipated to cost $5 million to $10 million for 
signage, outreach, overhead, and design. However, while congestion pricing is a great idea, its 
effectiveness is questionable. The current system has been shown to make a negligible difference 
in commute patterns, quite possibly due to the abundance of free or low cost parking available to 
commuters (A. Fremier, personal communication, September 20, 2016). Therefore the strategy 
should be pursued, but not at the expense of other strategies with proven effectiveness as it only 
offers minimal benefit. 
5.1.14 Strategy 14: Eastbound Tolling 
This strategy could be accomplished by one of two methods: cordon tolling in downtown 
San Francisco, and bidirectional tolling at the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza.  
5.1.14.1 Downtown San Francisco Cordon 
A similar cordon program in London, United Kingdom, cost $124 million per annum to 
implement, with revenues of $223 million per annum for a net gain of $99 million per annum 
(Litman, 2011, p. 11). Implementation in San Francisco would probably be similar, resulting in a 
net gain. However, while cordon tolling may help with congestion in and around San Francisco, it 
causes far too many headaches for consideration as a transbay congestion reduction strategy. In 
other words, it is a worthwhile idea that should be implemented, but not in the scope of reducing 
congestion on the bridge alone. As well, many transbay trips do not end up in downtown San 
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Francisco, but rather elsewhere in San Francisco or in San Mateo County. Cordon tolling would 
have no impact on these trips and so offers minimal benefit. 
5.1.14.2 Convert the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza into a Bidirectional Facility 
A method far more directly relevant to reducing transbay congestion is to convert the Bay 
Bridge Toll Plaza into a bidirectional facility. This could be combined with Strategy 10 (Electronic 
Tolling) for minimal impact to traffic, and Strategy 13 (Congestion Pricing) to promote carpooling 
and dissuade peak hour travel. On its own, this project would probably cost around $6,250,000 for 
the same reasons as the westbound direction outlined in Section 5.1.10. No additional revenue is 
anticipated though, as public goodwill concerns would most likely requisite splitting the westbound 
toll with the eastbound toll, so that the new eastbound toll does not unfairly tax commuters. Benefits 
could be considered split with the westbound direction, though, yielding $12 million for both rather 
than $24 million for the westbound direction, as outlined in Section 5.1.10. This would still 
categorize both strategies as a net gain no matter how it is split. On its own, bidirectional tolling 
would have some benefit, as it would incentivize eastbound carpooling and demand management, 
but it would not drastically alter the commute landscape.  
5.1.15 Strategy 15: Changing Corporate Cultures 
Outreach to San Francisco’s numerous offices promoting telecommuting, carpooling, and 
changing workplace vehicle demands can help reduce congestion by taking single occupancy 
vehicles off of the road. Programs and outreach for these tactics can be done immediately and at a 
low cost, so are highly recommended. Quantifying the cost and effect is difficult, as it could easily 
scale from a small taskforce operation to an all-out citywide mobilization. $1 million to $5 million 
for outreach and carshare subsidies, along with legislative changes detailed in Section 4.2.3.1, could 
net some benefit as drivers either stay home or are allowed to keep their cars at home. As estimated 
in Section 4.2.3.1, potentially 3,500 or more drivers could be taken off of the road daily by allowing 
them to telecommute, carpool, or take transit. Doubled for round trips (one eastbound and one 
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westbound), this would reduce daily demand by 7,000 vehicles or more on the Bay Bridge, and so 
garner extensive benefit upon implementation. 
5.1.16 Strategy 16: Land-Use Planning Changes 
While the purpose of this thesis is to explore short-term solutions to transbay congestion 
and changing land-use planning is a long-term strategy, it is nonetheless important to begin now to 
effectively plan for the future. Unlike a second bridge or tube that will not begin planning for many 
more years to come (if ever), land-use planning changes can and needs to begin now. The cost is 
low, less than $500,000, as most of the work would be done within government agencies through 
advising land-use changes that enable people to live closer to work and transit nodes. Some 
outreach costs would be incurred though, as the public-at-large might need convincing of this 
strategy’s necessity. Changing land-uses has the potential to create extensive benefit, as the most 
direct way to reduce demand on the bridge is to reduce the need to cross the bay in the first place, 
which can be achieved by bringing homes closer to workplaces and vice versa.  
 
5.2 STRATEGY COST VERSUS BENEFITS 
 Each strategy has now been assessed for cost and benefit using broad bins to assist with 
fiscal uncertainties. Table 5.1 lists the strategies and their cost and benefit categories. For strategies 
with multiple components, the components have been denoted alphabetically under the number of 
its parent strategy. Of note, Strategy 4c (expanding SolTrans Route 200 bus service), has been 
dropped from the analysis due to its planned abandonment. 
Figure 5.1 maps these strategies visually, using smaller circles with more defined borders 
to denote more exact cost estimates. Of note, while left-to-right positioning within each column 
roughly approximates cost, top-to-bottom positioning within each row is simply numerical rank. 
E.g. all of the strategies listed in the “Some Benefit” row have approximately the same benefit no 
matter their vertical positioning, but strategies on the right of the $1m-$5m cost column are 
anticipated to be more expensive than those on the left. Lastly, the graph has a background shading 
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from green to yellow to orange to red, to denote decreasing priority optimization. This is discussed 
further in the next section. 
 
Table 5.1: Roster of Strategies with Cost and Benefit Bins 
Name Cost Bin Benefit Bin 
1a Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards – Base Proposal 
$1m-$5m Great 1b 
Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane 
Standards – I-580 Eastbound Onramp to Maritime Avenue 
Intersection Extension 
1c Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards – Extension Past Maritime Avenue Intersection 
2a 
HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville 
– Convert Right Lane of I-80 to HOV from Before West 
Frontage Road Onramp to Powell Street Onramp 
$500k-$1m  None 
2b 
HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville 
– Convert Right Lane of I-80 to HOV from Powell Street 
Onramp to Existing HOV 
<$500k Great 
2c 
HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville 
– Powell Street Onramp Conversion to HOV and Adding 
More Movements to Access the Onramp 
$1m-$5m Great 
2d HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville – Park-and-Ride Lot <$500k Minimal 
3 MacArthur Onramp Bus Lane $10m-$50m Some 
4a Expand Bus Service – AC Transit $10m-$50m Great 
4b Expand Bus Service – WestCAT <$500k Some 
4c Expand Bus Service - SolTrans - - 
5a Commuter Parking – I-80 and Buchanan Street $1m-$5m Some 
5b Commuter Parking – I-880 and Fruitvale Avenue $1m-$5m Some 
5c Commuter Parking – I-880 and High Street $1m-$5m Some 
5d Commuter Parking – I-580 and Fairmont Drive/Foothill Boulevard $500k-$1m Some 
5e Commuter Parking – I-580 and Golf Links Road/98th $1m-$5m Some 
5f Commuter Parking – SR-24 and Telegraph Avenue/56
th 
Street $500k-$1m Minimal 
5g Commuter Parking – I-580 and Broadway/Piedmont Avenue $1m-$5m None 
5h Commuter Parking – BART Parking Capacity Increases $50m-$100m Some 
5i Commuter Parking – Partner with Ridesharing Apps for Station Access $500k-$1m Great 
6a Partner with Developers of Ridesharing Mobile Applications – Vanpools/Minibuses $500k-$1m Great 
6b Partner with Developers of Ridesharing Mobile Applications – Casual Carpools $500k-$1m Minimal 
7 Enhanced Casual Carpooling $1m-$5m Some 
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Name Cost Bin Benefit Bin 
8 Shifting Attitudes on Carpooling $10m-$50m Extensive 
9a Increased Enforcement – Adding HOV Facility Patrols <$500k Minimal 
9b Increased Enforcement – Citizen Reporting System $500k-$1m Extensive 
10 Electronic Tolling at the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza Net Gain Some 
11a BART Capacity Increases – Improving Train Capacity $10m-$50m Extensive 
11b BART Capacity Increases – Improving Station Capacity >$100m Extensive 
12a Altered BART Service – Skip-Stop “Metro” Service >$100m Extensive 
12b Altered BART Service – Express Service $5m-$10m Great 
13 Congestion Pricing $5m-$10m Minimal 
14a Eastbound Tolling – Downtown San Francisco Cordon Net Gain Minimal 
14b Eastbound Tolling – Convert the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza into a Bidirectional Facility Net Gain Some 
15 Changing Corporate Cultures $1m-$5m Extensive 
16 Land-Use Planning Changes <$500k Extensive 
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5.3 STRATEGY PRIORITIZATION 
Now that these strategies have been outlined, detailed, estimated for cost and benefit, 
tabulated, and graphed, they can be grouped by priority for implementation. Table 5.2 lists these 
strategies by priority group. The first group consists of strategies that should be vigorously pursued 
as soon as possible. The second group consists of strategies that should be implemented, but are 
not as essential as the first group. The third group consists of strategies that would help congestion 
if implemented, but are less economical and thus less important to pursue in the near-term. The 
fourth and last group consists of the select few strategies that have been recommended against and 
should not be implemented as currently designed. It is important to note that the contents of each 
group are not ranked by priority, but rather the arbitrary order in which they are listed throughout 
the thesis.  
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Table 5.2: Roster of Strategies by Priority 
Priority 1: Implement Now 
1a Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards – Base Proposal 
1b Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards – I-580 Eastbound Onramp 
to Maritime Avenue Intersection Extension 
1c Upgrade West Grand Avenue Onramp to Bus Lane Standards – Extension Past Maritime 
Avenue Intersection 
2b HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville – Powell Street Onramp 
Conversion to HOV and Adding More Movements to Access the Onramp 
2c HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville – Convert Right Lane of I-80 
to HOV from Powell Street Onramp to Existing HOV 
5i Commuter Parking – Partner with Ridesharing Apps for Station Access 
6a Partner with Developers of Ridesharing Mobile Applications – Vanpools/Minibuses 
9b Increased Enforcement – Citizen Reporting System 
10 Electronic Tolling at the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza 
14b Eastbound Tolling – Convert the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza into a Bidirectional Facility 
15 Changing Corporate Cultures 
16 Land-Use Planning Changes 
Priority 2: Implement Soon 
4a Expand Bus Service – AC Transit 
4b Expand Bus Service – WestCAT 
5a Commuter Parking – I-80 and Buchanan Street 
5b Commuter Parking – I-880 and Fruitvale Avenue 
5c Commuter Parking – I-880 and High Street 
5d Commuter Parking – I-580 and Fairmont Drive/Foothill Boulevard 
5e Commuter Parking – I-580 and Golf Links Road/98th  
7 Enhanced Casual Carpooling 
8 Shifting Attitudes on Carpooling 
11a BART Capacity Increases – Improving Train Capacity 
11b BART Capacity Increases – Improving Station Capacity 
12a Altered BART Service – Skip-Stop “Metro” Service 
12b Altered BART Service – Express Service 
Priority 3: Implement When Feasible 
2d HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville – Park-and-Ride Lot 
3 MacArthur Onramp Bus Lane 
5f Commuter Parking – SR-24 and Telegraph Avenue/56th Street 
5h Commuter Parking – BART Parking Capacity Increases 
6b Partner with Developers of Ridesharing Mobile Applications – Casual Carpools 
9a Increased Enforcement – Adding HOV Facility Patrols 
13 Congestion Pricing 
14a Eastbound Tolling – Downtown San Francisco Cordon 
Priority 4: Recommend Against Implementation 
2a HOV Improvements at Powell Street and I-80 in Emeryville – Convert Right Lane of I-80 
to HOV from Before West Frontage Road Onramp to Powell Street Onramp 
4c Expand Bus Service - SolTrans 
5g Commuter Parking – I-580 and Broadway/Piedmont Avenue 
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At the top of the list (in no particular order) are onramp improvements, such as restriping 
and upgrading the inlets on West Grand Avenue to support an HOV queue jump from before the 
Maritime Avenue intersection to the existing HOV onramp, converting the Powell Street onramp 
into HOV only, adding access from more directions, and connecting the top of the ramp directly to 
the existing HOV lanes right before the toll plaza. Partnering with developers of ridesharing apps 
also received highest priority, to help commuters access transit stations and to provide 
vanpool/minibus service. One carpool strategy is highly recommended – implementing a citizen 
report system for carpool violators. Two tolling strategies that work have highest priority as well, 
that is implementing electronic tolling at the Bay Bridge Toll Plaza and converting the toll plaza 
into a bidirectional facility. Lastly, two “bigger picture” items are included: shifting corporate 
cultures away from requiring single-occupancy vehicle use and shifting land-use planning to make 
use of TODs and reverse commutes.  
Once these strategies have been implemented or at least secured financially and politically, 
priority should be given to the second tier of strategies. These include expanding or altering AC 
Transit and WestCAT transbay bus service, adding five park-and-ride lots, implementing an 
enhanced casual carpool system, shifting attitudes on carpooling, increasing BART train and station 
capacity, and implementing express and/or skip-stop “metro” service on BART. 
After all of the above strategies have been exhausted, the lowest level of recommended 
strategies should be tackled. These include the MacArthur onramp and queue jump, additional park-
and-ride capacity, partnering with rideshare apps to promote causal carpooling, partnering with 
casual carpool app developers to increase carpool rates, increasing HOV enforcement, and applying 
congestion pricing and/or a downtown San Francisco toll cordon.  
Three strategies were explored, but should not be implemented. The HOV lane on I-80 
from before the West Frontage Road onramp to the Powell Street onramp should not be 
implemented as it offers little benefit for huge expense. Expanded bus service for SolTrans is not 
recommended due to fleet age and superfluous nature of the service. Lastly, the park-and-ride lot 
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at I-580 and Broadway/Piedmont Avenue is isolated from the freeway and would replace an 
existing land use. 
With these strategies prioritized, they can be tackled and implemented as soon as feasible 
in order to improve the notoriously horrendous transbay commute. This will allow commuters to 
get where they are going faster, reducing time wasted in traffic or cramped in trains, buses or ferries, 
all the while improving overall health and the economy. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
As shown throughout this thesis, congestion is a major issue on the transbay corridor across 
all modes of transportation, including private vehicles and buses on the Bay Bridge, BART in the 
Transbay Tube, and ferry services across the Bay. This severe congestion was quantitatively 
assessed for demand, capacity, and occupancy, in order to glean potential opportunities for 
improvement. Sixteen strategies were compiled, combining existing proposals and plans relevant 
to the transbay corridor with several new proposals, both original to this thesis and building upon 
past experiences and suggestions of others. These strategies were detailed and evaluated in terms 
of costs and benefits, ultimately being ranked in priority order. While it would be fantastic to 
implement every component of all sixteen strategies here and now, budget shortfalls, political will, 
bureaucratic inertia, and other constraints prevent this idealism. 
 
6.1 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 There are several limitations to this research. Perhaps most notably is that while the data 
provided is mostly complete, there are some assumptions that had to be made. One such assumption 
is the eastbound private vehicle occupancy of 1.54 persons per vehicle, based on a weighted average 
of westbound HOV and non-HOV occupancies. Another assumption is that the average private 
vehicle has a capacity of five persons, which was based on the median value for fleet sales data 
rather than an average of operational fleet data or even better, exact counts by vehicle type on the 
bridge. One other assumption is that BART users immediately exit the system upon arrival. While 
generally this is true, aberrations in exit times could affect the binning of the data, producing 
slightly different results. Speaking of transit, another assumption was capacity for AC Transit, 
which was based on load factors rather than direct capacity numbers. Lastly, WestCAT Lynx data 
required some guesswork in order to bin fare counts to different buses, as not all fares were logged 
in the exact time and place that the rider got on the bus. For instance, some fares were logged with 
coordinates over the Bay or a timestamp that surpasses the last arrival time of the day. While none 
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of these assumptions are significant enough to entirely sideline this thesis, replacing them with 
direct and empirical values would help to further refine the analysis. 
 Another limitation of this research is the wide range of data. Ridership and vehicle counts 
spanned September to October in 2015 and June to October in 2016, as well as pockets of data 
pulled from other time periods, such as vehicle occupancy rates from 2012. This could lead to 
aberrations in analysis as more recent numbers are more likely to show higher demand. 
 One other limitation is the upcoming Transbay Terminal. Presently, East Bay buses wade 
through traffic in downtown San Francisco to access the Temporary Transbay Terminal. However, 
once the new Transbay Terminal and its direct bus-only connection to the Bay Bridge opens, buses 
will be able to more quickly access the Transbay Terminal, improving reliability, reducing travel 
times, and increasing ridership. Ridership data tends to fluctuate year-by-year with a generally 
upward trend, but the opening of the Transbay Terminal will likely have a significant impact on 
ridership growth. 
 One major limitation of this research is that while some costs and benefits were quantified, 
many were estimated. This is due to limitations of the nature of a thesis, in that a full complement 
of technical experts is not available to accurately assess the time savings, ridership growth, or other 
metrics of success and their costs for each of the strategies. For the purviews of this research, 
estimates based on similar examples will have to do. 
 One limitation that is not rectifiable with any budget or staff size is that the situation is 
constantly evolving over time. Many of the news articles used in this research were published less 
than a month before being integrated into the thesis. As mentioned before, ridership data is 
constantly fluctuating and generally increasing. Therefore, if this thesis was to be done a year earlier 
or a year later, differences in both data procured and recommendations developed could occur. 
 One last limitation is that congestion on the Bay Bridge corridor is overall a unique case. 
There is plenty of literature on improving individual components, such as the various congestion 
cordon case studies, or effects of improving transit on ridership, but the situation as a whole is 
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rather peerless. The San Francisco Bay presents a unique geographical barrier that is just wide 
enough to prevent a multitude of crossings (unlike e.g. a river), but just narrow enough to promote 
the notion that crossing is not a huge endeavor (unlike e.g. the English Channel). This lends the 
Bay Area to have heavy transbay travel demands, as Chapter 3 thoroughly demonstrated, but few 
routes on which to cross. The limitation here is that solutions that work in other places with more 
conventional constraints might run into operational issues in the Bay. One example from the 
literature review is Jochum et al.’s suggestion for Columbus to implement a light rail system. This 
proposal would not work on the transbay corridor because it would require either taking away from 
auto capacity at great operational and fiscal expense, or building a second tube or bridge to 
accommodate the tracks. At that point, the light rail right-of-way would be better utilized as a 
second BART crossing rather than its own entity.  
 
6.2 FUTURE RESEARCH GOALS 
 This research takes an inventory of existing research and greatly expands upon it. Future 
research would be wise to take into account the shortcomings of this research, as well as continuing 
to expand the toolkit of potential solutions. One future goal should be to replace the assumptions 
listed above with exact values where possible. For instance, seat count data for private vehicles was 
assumed using the median seats per car sold, whereas exact counts would be more preferable. 
Additionally, research on the rate of casual carpooling, as well as origin-destination demand counts, 
could help further shed light on how this tactic operates and areas for improvement. Relatedly, 
costs and benefits should be estimated using empirical and established practices.  
 An overarching goal of future research should be to continue to brainstorm new ideas as 
well as adopt the best practices from elsewhere. This will ensure that no fresh opportunities are 
missed because the researchers are set in old ways. Some opportunities include improved methods 
of implementing dynamic tolling and even seemingly unlikely ideas such as reversible lanes or 
HOV lanes on the bridge itself. After all, the Bay Bridge itself was once deemed impossible. 
  135 
 
 
 One last goal is to continue to monitor the evolving transbay commute conditions. With 
each transbay mode at capacity during peak hours, the projected 30% growth in Bay Area 
population will have a difficult time traveling between Oakland and San Francisco without capacity 
enhancements or demand management. A keen eye will be needed to adapt to shifting 
demographics and emerging technologies. This will become especially important once connected 
and autonomous vehicles start to enter the mainstream. 
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